A harmadik START-szerződés
2010.04.08.

Az amerikai és az orosz elnök, Barack Obama és Dmitrij Medvegyev Prágában, a vár Spanyol-termében írta alá a hadászati támadó fegyverek korlátozásáról és csökkentéséről szóló új szerződést.

A két hatalom közötti START-tárgyalások és szerződések immár két évtizednél is hosszabb múltra tekintenek vissza. Az első START-szerződést 1991. július 31-én írta alá George Bush amerikai és Mihail Gorbacsov szovjet elnök Moszkvában. (A szerződés 1994-ben lépett életbe.) A másodiknak az aláírása George Bush és Borisz Jelcin elnökök nevéhez fűződik (Moszkva, 1993. január 3.) Ez a szerződés azonban az évtized második felétől elhidegült amerikai–orosz kapcsolatok közepette nem lépett életbe. A START-II körüli bizonytalanságtól függetlenül a stratégiai fegyverek számát mindkét nagyhatalom folyamatosan csökkentette az első START-szerződés rendelkezéseinek megfelelően, s ez nem változott Vlagyimir Putyin és G. W. Bush hatalomra kerülésével sem. A bizonytalanságok részbeni áthidalására a felek tető alá hozták a SORT (Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty) szerződést, amelyet Moszkvában írták alá 2002. május 24. én.

A START-szerződések a stratégiai, vagyis hadászati nukleáris fegyverzetrendszerekkel, a hordozóeszközökkel és a robbanófejekkel foglalkoznak, hatókörük nem terjed ki a taktikai nukleáris fegyverekre. A megállapodások alapján stratégiai fegyverzetrendszereknek minősülnek a nagy hatótávolságú, interkontinentális ballisztikus rakétákon (ICBM), a tengeralattjárókon (SLBM) és a nagy hatótávolságú (vagyis 5500 kilométernél nagyobb hatósugarú) repülőgépeken rendszeresített, nagy hatóerejű nukleáris fegyverek. Nem tartoznak tehát közéjük a taktikai (harcászati) nukleáris fegyverek, amelyek kis, rövid- és közepes hatótávolságú ballisztikus rakétákon és repülőgépeken vannak rendszeresítve. A START-szerződések fókuszában a hordozóeszközök és a nukleáris atomtöltetek száma áll, általában ezek alapján számolják ki a stratégiai egyensúlyt biztosító fegyvermennyiséget. A fegyverzet-csökkentési tárgyalások számításai körüli viták alapját az adja, hogy egy hordozóeszközre (rakétára vagy repülőgépre) több, akár 3–10 darab, más-más célpontra vezethető atomtöltet is felszerelhető, emellett az Egyesült Államok és Oroszország nukleáris arzenáljának az arányai eltérőek a hordozóeszközök típusait illetően is. Így bonyolult számításokat igényel a felek közötti stratégiai egyensúly, vagyis a kölcsönös sebezhetőség fenntartása.

A START-szerződések csak egyik elemét jelentik a még régen megálmodott nukleáris fegyverek nélküli világ megteremtését célzó rendszernek. Amerikai részről John F. Kennedy és Ronald Reagan elnökök, szovjet részről Nyikita Hruscsov és Gorbacsov tettek hitet tettek leginkább az ilyen világ megteremtése mellett. Legutóbb Obama elnök prágai beszédében (2009. április) hirdette meg, hogy kormánya ilyen világért kíván munkálkodni, igaz, hozzátette, hogy ez az ő életében valószínűleg nem fog megvalósulni, s az Egyesült Államok addig is fenntartja nukleáris elrettentő erejét.

Az új START-szerződésre vonatkozó tárgyalások minden az elmúlt évben felgyorsultak. A szerződés általános kereteinek kidolgozásáról 2009 júliusában a moszkvai találkozón állapodott meg Obama és Medvegyev. Ezt követően az ENSZ Biztonsági Tanácsa határozatott fogadott el a nukleáris leszerelés szükségességéről (2009. szeptember 24.). Az új szerződés kidolgozását az is sürgette, hogy a 2009.

december 5-én lejárt az addig hatályban meghosszabbított első START- és a SORT-szerződés.

A prágai START-szerződés legfontosabb rendelkezései a következők: a rendszeresített robbanófejek számát 1550-ben (ez 74 százalékos csökkentést jelent a START-I-hez képest), a hordozóeszközök számát – beleértve a nem rendszerbe állított eszközöket is – a szerződés 800-ban maximalizálja, és ebből a plafonból 700 lehet rendszerbe állítva. A verifikáció tekintetében az egyezmény kis módosításokkal az első START-szerződés rendelkezéseit veszi át, így rendelkezik a helyszíni szemlékről, az ellenőrzésekről és adatcserékről. A szerződés tíz évre szól, a hatálybalépéshez pedig a szerződés ratifikálására van szükség. A megállapodás az amerikai akaratnak megfelelően nem állapít meg semmilyen korlátot új rakétavédelmi rendszerek kifejlesztése és rendszerbe állítása tekintetében, említést tesz azonban a rakétavédelem kérdéséről, s ezzel elismeri a két kérdéskör közötti összefüggést. A most kialkudott számok és mennyiségek nem kérdőjelezik meg az amerikai és az orosz stratégiai képességek elsőbbségét a többi nukleáris hatalommal szemben.

„Az új START-szerződés fontos előrelépés a nukleáris leszerelés útján" – jelentette ki a dokumentum aláírása után elmondott rövid beszédében Obama. Hozzátette: „A stratégiai és a taktikai fegyverzet csökkentéséről szóló tárgyalásainkat folytatni fogjuk". Medvegyev elnök „történelmi eseménynek" minősítette a szerződés aláírását. Leszögezte: „értelmes kompromisszumról van szó", s a szerződés megvalósításával „biztonságosabb lesz a világ".

Megfigyelők szerint a megállapodás újabb mérföldkövet jelent a nukleáris fegyverektől mentes világ megteremtése felé vezető úton, és főként fontos lépés a két fél közötti bizalom erősítésében.

A dokumentumot újra közreadja Horváth Jenő.
Forrás: Az orosz elnök honlapja: http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2010/04/225211.shtml
A szerződéshez kapcsolódó jegyzőkönyv ugyanott olvasható:
http://eng.kremlin.ru/images/Protocol.pdf

Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
April 8, 2010

The Russian Federation and the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Believing that global challenges and threats require new approaches to interaction across the whole range of their strategic relations,

Working therefore to forge a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation,

Desiring to bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with this new relationship, and endeavoring to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons,

Committed to the fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and to the achievement of the historic goal of freeing humanity from the nuclear threat,

Expressing strong support for on-going global efforts in non-proliferation,

Seeking to preserve continuity in, and provide new impetus to, the step-by-step process of reducing and limiting nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, and with a view to expanding this process in the future, including to a multilateral approach,

Guided by the principle of indivisible security and convinced that measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security of both Parties,

Recognizing the existence of the interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties,

Mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability,

Taking into account the positive effect on the world situation of the significant, verifiable reduction in nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century,

Desiring to create a mechanism for verifying compliance with the obligations under this Treaty, adapted, simplified, and made less costly in comparison to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START Treaty,

Recognizing that the START Treaty has been implemented by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the United States of America, and that the reduction levels envisaged by the START Treaty were achieved,

Deeply appreciating the contribution of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to nuclear disarmament and to strengthening international peace and security as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968,

Welcoming the implementation of the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Protocol.

2. Definitions of terms used in this Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol.

Article II

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;

(c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

2. Each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms.

Article III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM shall be counted as one.

(b) Each deployed SLBM shall be counted as one.

(c) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

2. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(b) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) For ICBMs and SLBMs, the number of warheads shall be the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and on deployed SLBMs.

(b) One nuclear warhead shall be counted for each deployed heavy bomber.

3. For the purposes of counting toward the aggregate limit provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.

(b) Each non-deployed launcher of ICBMs shall be counted as one.

(c) Each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.

(d) Each non-deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be counted as one.

(e) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

(f) Each non-deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one.

4. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.

5. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when the silo door is first installed and closed;

(d) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(e) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(f) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of such a heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to such heavy bomber airframes.

6. ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers shall cease to be subject to this Treaty in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. ICBMs or SLBMs of an existing type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty if all ICBM or SLBM launchers of a type intended for such ICBMs or SLBMs have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

7. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the provisions of this Treaty apply.

(b) Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments shall be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

(c) Heavy bombers of the same type shall cease to be subject to this Treaty or to the limitations thereof when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted, as appropriate, to a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

8. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24.

(b) Existing types of SLBMs are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, the RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;

(ii) for the United States of America, the Trident II.

(c) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the B-52G, B-52H, B-1B, and B-2A;

(ii) for the Russian Federation, the Tu-95MS and Tu-160.

(d) Existing types of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers are:

(i) for the Russian Federation, ICBM launchers RS-12M, RS-12M2, RS-18, RS-20, and RS-24; SLBM launchers RSM-50, RSM-52, RSM-54, and RSM-56;

(ii) for the United States of America, ICBM launchers Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper; the SLBM launchers Trident II.

Article IV

1. Each Party shall base:

(a) deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases;

(b) deployed heavy bombers only at air bases.

2. Each Party shall install deployed launchers of SLBMs only on ballistic missile submarines.

3. Each Party shall locate:

(a) non-deployed launchers of ICBMs only at ICBM bases, production facilities, ICBM loading facilities, repair facilities, storage facilities, conversion or elimination facilities, training facilities, test ranges, and space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases;

(b) non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at, as appropriate, submarine bases, ICBM or SLBM loading facilities, maintenance facilities, repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs, test ranges, space launch facilities, and production facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases.

4. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be in transit. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.

5. Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only at test ranges.

6. Training launchers may be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo

launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than ten.

8. Each Party shall base test heavy bombers only at heavy bomber flight test centers. Non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers shall be located only at repair facilities or production facilities for heavy bombers.

9. Each Party shall not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

10. Strategic offensive arms shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities.

11. Strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty shall not be based outside the national territory of each Party. The obligations provided for in this paragraph shall not affect the Parties' rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. Heavy bombers may be temporarily located outside the national territory, notification of which shall be provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article V

1. Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. When a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

3. Each Party shall not convert and shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. Each Party further shall not convert and shall not use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. This provision shall not apply to ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein.

Article VI

1. Conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities shall be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means for removal from accountability shall be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Verification of conversion or elimination in accordance with this Treaty shall be carried out by:

(a) national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of this Treaty; and

(b) inspection activities as provided for in Article XI of this Treaty.

Article VII

1. A database pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty shall be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol to this Treaty. Categories of data for this database are set forth in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall notify the other Party about changes in data and shall provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to this Treaty.

3. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty.

4. Each Party may provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis, in addition to the notifications specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, if it deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under this Treaty.

5. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of this Treaty. The Parties shall have the right to release to the public such data and information following agreement thereon within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission. Each Party shall have the right to release to the public data related to its respective strategic offensive arms.

6. Geographic coordinates relating to data provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, unique identifiers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to this Treaty shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.

7. Notwithstanding paragraph 5 of this Article, the aggregate numbers of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate numbers of warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate numbers of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.

Article VIII

In those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations, that Party shall take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms, to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information shall be provided through diplomatic or other channels.

Article IX

By mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be exchanged on a parity basis. The Parties shall agree on the amount of exchange of such telemetric information.

Article X

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) to use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;

(b) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article; and

(c) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. The obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

Article XI

1. For the purpose of confirming the accuracy of declared data on strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspection activities in accordance with this Article and Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at ICBM bases, submarine bases, and air bases. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty; the number of warheads located on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs; and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers. Such inspections shall hereinafter be referred to as Type One inspections.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at facilities listed in Section VII of Part Five of the Protocol to this Treaty. The purpose of such inspections shall be to confirm the accuracy of declared data on the numbers, types, and technical characteristics of non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty and to confirm that strategic offensive arms have been converted or eliminated.

In addition, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at formerly declared facilities, which are provided for in Part Two of the Protocol to this Treaty, to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

The inspections provided for in this paragraph shall hereinafter be referred to as Type Two inspections.

4. Each Party shall conduct exhibitions and have the right to participate in exhibitions conducted by the other Party. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate distinguishing features and to confirm technical characteristics of new types, and to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of each type of strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty.

Article XII

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the authority and procedures for the operation of which are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol to this Treaty.

Article XIII

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall not transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties shall hold consultations within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. This provision shall not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Article XIV

1. This Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of this Treaty, the Parties shall jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend this Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party. Such notice shall contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. This Treaty shall terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.

4. As of the date of its entry into force, this Treaty shall supersede the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002, which shall terminate as of that date.

Article XV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

2. If it becomes necessary to make changes in the Protocol to this Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under this Treaty, the Parties shall use the Bilateral Consultative Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments that is set forth in paragraph 1 of this Article.

Article XVI

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Prague on April 8, 2010 in two originals, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION	FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PRESIDENT D.A.MEDVEDEV	PRESIDENT B.OBAMA