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The Origin of the Soft Power Analytical Concept

A Philosophical and Historical Approach of Political Theories, Concepts and Practices based on 'Western' Ideals

ABSTRACT

The origins of both USA's soft power force and of the analytical concept of soft power is the broad consensus of social values conceived in the spirit of the Enlightenment, the theoretical basis of which is a non-feudal and non-dynastic society based on human rights and individual freedom, and which the American people consider a jewel of their conservative liberal value system, as enshrined in their constitution.

This paper outlines the historical development of the value system and ideology that to this day dominate Western Civilization, began during the XVII. century and flourished in the course of the Enlightenment of the XVIII. century. The paper outlines furthermore the American exceptionalism and sense of mission that originates from the establishment of the first American colonies in the 17th century. As the origins of soft power analytical concept focus on what is considered to be the universally-held value system of the United States, this study examines the ideals and thinkers of the Enlightenment who have grounded this value system 'primarily' or 'just' from ideological distance, most significantly the works and roles of Locke, Hobbes and Kant. In the chapter on American exceptionalism and sense of mission, this study highlights the works and influence of the personalities who, by simplifying, were the forerunners and main advocates of non-military policies and liberal internationalism.

Introduction

Soft power is often described as the expression of conventions, regional and national foreign affairs strategies, attraction-based influence and co-operation free of military or financial "reward". In 2004, when the concept was introduced, Harvard professor Joseph Nye described American liberal democracy and its culture as the central element of individual freedom based on human rights as an universal value and conceptual model, analyzing and affirming its universal validity. This system is based on the values and ideals of freedom, legality, constitutionality and the role of the individual.

The historical – ideological – philosophical origin of soft power analytical concept is extremely instructive.

This study attempts to make two theoretical reviews having differing foci. In the first chapter, it analyzes the most important thinkers and documents of European philosophy, state theory and political history that have grounded this value and conceptual system in its historical context. In the second chapter, it draws the historic stations of exceptionalism and mission of the United States of America - the country in which "soft power" was conceptualized -, dating back to its colonial period.

I. The source of the today's Western ideals and value-system: the Enlightenment

Enlightenment as an intellectual and philosophical movement, began in the 17th century and flourished in the 18th century, still dominate the ideas, value-system and thinking of Western civilization. Its thinkers focused on reason as well as propriety and understanding of the world, and questioned the institutions, customs, and morals of the Middle Ages. As the political situation stabilized after Westphalian peace and the British civil war, there was tried to support knowledge and stability with axiomatic philosophy and absolutism. Later, on the ground of deism, a different perception of law was promoted, based on not familiar, dynastic or religious ground but on the relationship between individuals. The individual freedom as a fundamental human right became increasingly important, thus, extending, there was not already the 'Holy King' who could rule the law first in the world of the ideals then in the practice.

A. The social treaty theory of the XVII. century, or theories of two British parents of modern political thinking: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke

1. The XVII. century: multifaceted mélange

The European history of the XVII. century was a multifaceted mélange, simultanously reflecting both Middle and New ages. Its first decades were dominated by a bloody religious war that mobilized several powers, and by the middle of the century it was defined by national civil war. The century was typically the age of absolutism throughout Europe, but in the English Kingdom the second half of the century was the period of Glorious Revolution leading to constitutional monarchy, the Declaration of the Bill of Rights.

The term was significantly influenced by the Enlightenment and the age of intellect, which drove the up-and-coming geyser of thinkers and works.

In 1648, the Westphalian peace closed perhaps the most vicious international struggle of religious warfare, the thirty-year war. Almost all the powers of the continent were involved in the struggle. This peace was a sort of new beginning in political thought, when the European balance policy and diplomacy of non-religious, sovereign nation-states (albeit often dynastic) took hold.

In the Kingdom of England, the Long Parliament sat for 20 years, albeit with serious interruption. The British civil war played out between 1642 and 1649, coming to an end with the fall of the absolute monarchy via the execution of Charles I, whose support for the arts was reciprocated by artists' favorable portrayal of the monarchy and empire. (The spark of the Revolution in 1640 was the monarch's convention of not convening the assembly for long periods, similar to the cause of the French Revolution at the end of the following century.) After the death of Charles I., the protectorate of Oliver Cromwell was followed in 1660 by the restoration of the Stuarts. Charles II., who was a Stuart, in similar fashion to the house of the Bourbons in France, seemingly learned nothing from his ancestors' mistakes; even the accumulated works of talented artists conveyed his power's exceptionalism.[1] One had to wait until the Glorious Revolution of 1888-89 or more precisely until the world-historical moment of the birth of the constitutional monarchy, in 1889, when William III. (of Orange) adopted the Bill of Rights, and hence implicitly the theory of Hobbes and Locke's social contract as well as the division of power according to the doctrines of Montesquieu and Locke.

2. The founders of modern political and state philosophy: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke

Thomas Hobbes, born at the end of the 17th century, is considered to be one of the founders of modern political and state philosophy not only by his contemporaries but in general. Published in 1651, his masterwork the Leviathan („Leviathan, The Matter, Forme and Power of Common-Wealth Ecclesiastical and Civil"), a political bestseller and the first work to develop social contract theory, became a permanent reference point for pro and contra argumentation.

John Locke, half a century younger, is often referred to as one of the most influential thinkers of the Enlightenment, and is known as the "Father of Liberalism." He was the primary representative of materalist empiricism (based on the principle that recognition comes from experience through perception), but at least as influential was his theory of social contract. Thomas Jefferson considered him a master and the American Declaration of Independence contains several word-for-word lines of the philosopher.

Thomas Hobbes held that an "unlimited" absolute monarch of England was realistic. Leviathan (1651) argued for royal sovereignty. According to the "contractual" state concept, the subjects, who have waived their sovereign rights for their safety, are obliged to retain sovereign laws. They do this by maintaining their natural rights, but these rights are almost exclusively limited to self-defense.

The new situation created by the English Revolution brought a new theory of sovereign. The actual power distribution between parliament and the king in Locke's view („Two Treatises on Civil Governance", 1690) is expressed by the sovereignty of the king as the monarch and the parliament in the co-ordinated exercise of power (the King in Parliament).

Hobbes is referred to as the forerunner of realism by the theory of politics, and held the "unlimited" absolute monarchy realistic in his works, but he also elaborated several fundamental ideas

of European liberalism (as did Locke), as Pierre Manet draws attention to in his book "An Intellectual History of Liberalism "[2]. Such thought includes the right of the individual, the natural equality of all men, the artificial character of the political order, the view that all legitimate political power must be „representative" and based on the consent of people; and the liberal interpretation of law that leaves people free to do whatever the law does not explicitely forbid.

The difference between the philosophies of Hobbes and Locke is in their perception of the natural state and their thinking about the way in which power is transferred.

Hobbes, who was influenced by a Puritan teacher during his Oxford school years, came of age during the absolutist era where everything was conveyed: the chaotic, anarchic relations elevated the ruler as the upholder of order and the pillar of security. This ideal was conveyed under the reign of Kings James I. and Charles I. by the performances of masques of Banqeting House, this exceptionally beautiful palace, which had amazingly survived fires and war lootings Furthermore, this ideal was conveyed by the ceiling fresco of the White Hall – the glorification of King James I. - painted by the epoch-defining artist and diplomat, Sir Peter Paul Rubens, at the invitation of Charles I.

The ruler wanted to establish a worthy memorial to his father. Among the movement of allegorical and mythical figures, ribbons, baroque angels appears the absolute monarch, James I., the first English Stuart ruler (the successor to Elizabeth I), in a portrayal of his peaceful reign, which included the union of Ireland. / The three main canopies of the ceiling include the Union of the Crown, the Apotheosis of James I and the Peaceful Reign of James I./

Charles I. was executed 13 years later in front of the same building on a common wooden bench, the location also was obviously symbolic.

Hobbes's masterpiece, Leviathan, was written in exile in Paris during the civil war that claimed significant victims on both sides. While the battle did not directly affect its territory, France bore the painful wounds of the thirty-year war.

The point of departure for Hobbes's political writings was that human beings were guided by instinctual self-preservation and the inexhaustible desire for power, as encapsulated in the quotation „… Man to Man is an arrant Wolf" („Homo homini lupus est")[3]. Hobbes postulated what life would be like without government, a condition which he called the state of nature. In that state, each person would have a right, or license, to everything in the world. This, Hobbes argued, would lead to a "war of all against all" (bellum omnium contra omnes).

With the famous lines of the philosopher, in man's nature, "... there is no art, no letters, no society; and which is the worst in all, everlasting fear prevails, threatens the danger of violent death, and human life is lonely, ugly, animalistic, and short "[4]

Hobbes's man is not Aristotle's "zoon politikon" ('political animal') but rather is characterized by desire, fear and intellect, the combination of instinct and rationalism. From this situation, follows the necessity of emergence of an all-powerful institution above man. According to Hobbes, peace can only be achieved through the establishment of a state: through either agreement or occupation. By agreement, some of the rights of the subjects are transfered to the sovereign, while if by occupation, the sovereign violently siezes power. In any case, the sovereign must be just and uphold the contract. For Hobbes, the sovereign may be either an individual or body of individuals (summum bonum).

The goal of Hobbes' state is neither to achieve the optimal outcome, nor to motivate prosperity, but rather to circumvent the dangers of the natural state, the avoidance of the worst outcome (summum malum).

According to the "contractual" state concept, the subjects who have waived their rights (maintaining their natural rights, which is the sole right of self-defence) for the sake of their security are obliged to retain sovereign laws, such the subjects do not have human freedom. Thus Hobbes's conception is clearly authoritarian. Hobbes - as his French predecessor, Jean Boden -, acknowledged the reality of the "unlimited" absolute monarchy in England during that era. Meanwhile, this study shares the point of Pierre Monet's assumption that for Hobbes the subjects are the empower of sovereignty, which the sovereign, as representative, holds.

In the moral and political language developed by Hobbes, which is still in use today, good is usurped by law, for his followers the law of the individual.

As a 17-year-old high school student, if Locke was not present at the execution of Charles I., he knew it occured near Wesminster School, where Locke studied at the time. Then, like Hobbes, he attended Oxford, where he enrolled at Christ Church College. While the university offered classics of

the age, Locke instead began to focus on medicine in the age of Descartes. He took the restoration of Charles II. with mixed feelings. His medical studies were of great use as he met his patron, Lord Ashley - later Count Shaftesbury - through his doctor's qualification. The Lord, between 1667 and 1683, became the most influential politician in the court of Charles II., serving as Lord Chancellor from 1672 to 1673. Locke also held serious political functions under Count Shaftesbury. (Incidentally, Count Shaftesbury later served as the leader of a nationwide political opposition that threatened to overthrow the monarch by revolution. (Count Shaftesbury also died in exile.)

In 1660-61, during his years in Oxford, Locke developed the foundations of the state's development and operation („Two Tracts on Government"), supplemented and revised in 1690 by „Two Treatises on Government".

Locke was the first regular exponent of power distribution theory. He transformed social factors into institutions, and apart from the triad of power, he distinguished the federal function of the state – declaration of war, peace agreement, entering binding of international treaties, and so on - and non-autonomous wielded power. (This conceptual system rooted in the social reality of 17th-century England, in which the various social forces - the crown, the lords and the common citizens – started to achieve balance.)

Meanwhile, like Hobbes, Locke also claimed that man was inherently not socially organized, but „his own master" in his natural state. In the natural state of Locke, natural law created by God forbade the destruction of the lives, health, freedom and property of others. In his view, however, this state of affairs could be peaceful if society did not neglect natural law. Laws were created for curbing such offenses, and to empower a higher instance, chosen by society, for the sake of avoiding conflict, on the condition that society adheres to natural law. If leaders fail to comply with natural law, the people have the right to pursue revolution.

The new situation created by the English Revolution, adoption of the Bill of Rights in 1688-89 brought a new theory of sovereignty. At the same time, the separation of powers under the Montesquieu principles took place when, as the 'last chapter of the English Revolution', William III. (Orange) adopted the 'Bill of Rights' and thus formed a new state, the constitutional monarchy, one hundred years before the announcement of the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights.

The actual power distribution between parliament and the king by Locke („Two Treatises on Civil Governance", 1690) is expressed in the sense of sovereignty as the coordinated exercise of power between the monarchy and the parliament (the King in the Parliament). For Locke, the law had a prominent role: in his concept the law is the only public act where the required criterion - even a conceptual element - is societal approval. Consequently, a law can only be made by a legislative power, since it is only possible to have one's legislative power over society with the consent and authorization of its members. According to Locke, where there is no law there is no freedom either. The natural freedom of man means that he is governed by natural law and nothing else can limit him.

B. The end of the XVIII. century: the overlapping of the two modern constitutions' principles of the USA and France and of the Peace Theory of Prussian Immanuel Kant

It was of extraordinary historical significance when, on September 17, 1787, the Philadelphia Convention adopted the Constitution of the United States of America, after an extremely bloody revolutionary war, as the first manifestation of the practice of modern multi-party republican form of state. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution laid the foundations of "American Creed", confidence in human freedom, democracy and individualism while laying the foundations for the practical implementation of republicanism, federalism, separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. The American Declaration of Independence contains several verbatim lines written by Locke.

These basic principles served as a model for most of the political changes in Central European countries until the crisis of 2008, or at least until the USA's intervention in Iraq of 2003. These values have been marked as the foundation of society, in which all of them, regardless of background, believed in conviction and in the long run.

The introduction of the American constitution set forth the model of state apparatus that was interpretable as a real, realistic embodiment of the basic condition of the democratic peace concept of

Immanuel Kant, first put forward at the end of the 18th century. According to the contents of the statute – borrowed from Kant's simultanously-written categories - "the autonomous, moral self" acts on the basis of the "categorical imperative" (the demands of moral law). [1]

The terms quoted above are the basic categories of the moral philosophy as set forth in "Critique of Practical Reason" by Kant, the founder of German idealism. In the theory of democratic peace, the philosopher sought answers in a war-torn Europe - more precisely in the city of Königsberg, which he had left only a few times during his 80 years of life - how states could escape the anarchic phase of the international system, and to achieve a peaceful world order. The three pillars of the theory are three different writings: „Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose", the essay on "The Metaphysics of Morals" and "Perpetual Peace".

„Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose" (" Idee zu einer Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht ") published in 1784, was Kant's first, and perhaps most important, philosophical work. The essay proceeds by way of nine propositions through which Kant sought to prove his claim that rational and moral autonomy inevitably defeat the compulsions of self-interested individualism. Kant classified the constitutional republics of contemporary Western Europe - marked as they were by federalism, status-seeking, individualism and a degree of moral and cultural maturity - as belonging to an advanced, yet still intermediate stage of development, judging them to be *civilized* but not thoroughly *moral*. As critiques pointed out all other societies were deemed inferior and judged according to the benchmark of European nation-states. Furthermore Kant proposed that the European nations were tending towards statehood in a federation characterized by a universalist and cosmopolitan moral culture (Tully 2002: 341) With the world-famous words of Kant: „achieving the civic union of the human race must be regarded … possible"[2].

According to the essay entitled "Perpetual Peace", the other pillar of the democratic peace concept, disarmeament and common understanding of sovereign states serve to foster lasting peace. His work also raises the role of civil rights law (ius cosmopoliticum). For the sake of peace, it is necessary to create a kind of international law that would regulate inter-state relations and, on the other hand, the spread and growth of international trade, as trading countries would have not interest in waging war on each other. Kant saw a strong reconciliation tool in trade integration but only when it applies to trade between nations peoples of equal rank, and not in a context of nations in conflicting circumstances.
The essay was published in 1795, the same year when, according to the Basel Convention, Prussia withdrew from the first coalition war that was fought against the French Republic of Girondère by the feudalist-absolutist European monarchies. The Basel Peace concluded by the French Republic and the Prussian Kingdom on April 5, 1795, according to Kant, provided an exceptional historical opportunity for eternal peace among the nations of Europe to be realized. (With that illusion-destroying historical fact in the background, of course, that the war continued with Austria and England for another two and seven years, respectively.) In any case, the philosopher could not miss the implicit recognition of the new republican state in Basel Peace by the first European monarchy, Prussia. Equally important was the implicit acknowledgment of the French Republic, born in the 1789 Universal Declaration, by the great enlightened ruler Frederick II.'s successor, Frederick William II., whose other measures were less enlightened and reformist.

With regard to Kant's fundamental works of the theory of democratic peace, proof of history's irony and the conceptual diversity of democracy is that Kant's political creed was in favor of the constitution of the republic and against the democratic constitution. His classical republican theory was extended in the „Science of Right", the first part of „Metaphysics of Morals" (1797). Kant believed that universal history leads to the optimal world of republican

states - based upon the law (Rechtsstadt) - at peace. He opposed democracy, which at his time meant direct democracy, believing that majority rule posed a threat to individual liberty. Consequently he obviously refuted the French revolutionary experience. He stated „… democracy is, properly speaking, necessarily a despotism, because it establishes an executive power in which 'all' decide for or even against one who does not agree, that is 'all', who are not quite all, decide, and this is a contradiction of the general will with itself and with freedom." [3] (Kant grasped the paradox of all modernity at this point: he pointed out the inseparable relationship between despotism and democracy. At this point, there is a fundamental difference between Kant and, for example, Robespierre. The French national motto „Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité", the triangulum was first used by Robespierre in

1791 in his speech entitled "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité au Morte" ('Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood or Death') (In:"Organization of Civil Guards").

According to several contemporaries, democracy has the potential to eliminate itself (Wieland, Rousseau) or transform into tryanny. (Kant).

For Kant, the Prussia of Frederick II. was a model for a monarchy to develop into a representative system, and could attain the revolutionary goals of a true republic by way of reform.[4]

I would point out that in the time of Frederick II., the most prominent representative of Enlightened absolutism - who regarded himself as the only responsible servant of the state – and under those reign the Prussian state established the largest and best-organized army and thus became a great power.

The first European constitution of the Enlightenment, which carries the criteria of the Kantian constitution and peace theory, remained the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 26 August 1789. The declaration adopted Rousseau's theory of social contract, the theory of direct democracy („The Social Contract", 1762), in which the philosopher recognized the people as the only bearer of sovereignty. (In Rousseau's cited work, on the other hand, he denied the "horizontal" divisibility of power for which, as a principle of separation of power, system of checks and balances, was built into the American Constitution 25 years after Rousseau's masterpiece.)

The first version of „The Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen" was developed by La Fayette. Thomas Jefferson, the autor of the Declaration of Independence more than twelve years earlier, also reviewed it. (Jefferson served as an Ambassador of United States to France in 1785-89.)
History, in turn, confirmed the fears of the aforementioned philosophers, the French Revolution led to indiscriminate violence and turned to tyranny.

All in all, along with this, France has never been, and could never again be characterized by such absolutism where the rulers do not call together meeting of representatives for 175 years, the third order (80% of the population: bourgeoisie, craftsmen and workers, peasants together) bear the extraordinary burdens of the poorly managed state, and the citizenship is completely excluded from political power.

II. America's mission statement

In the American psyche, from the birth of the country to the present, there exists a belief in moral superiority relative to other countries. From the origin of the myth, perhaps, it is worth pointing out that the United States is the only major modern state founded on an ideology. (Richard Hofstadter: "America itself is an ideology.") Locke's liberalism and republicanism at the end of the 18th century were indeed an unique state-building theory. (Magyarics 2010: 4)

As indicated in the previous chapter, Thomas Jefferson considered John Locke to be a master. Locke was the first concrete advocate of civilian government. He also was the father of sensualist materialism (empiricism) and believed that human nature was fundamentally sensible and tolerant. Certain lines of the Declaration of Independence were incorporated word-for-word from Locke's writings. Like a classical representative of liberalism, he described the freedom of the individual as the most important political goal. (The original meaning of Liberalism derived from the Latin word liber, which means „not a servant".) In Locke's view, private property is an inalienable part of liberty.
Through the image that the United States was created by people who appreciated individual freedom and whose motto could be "My Country is Freedom", the US later became the "defender of the free world" during the Cold War. The dissemination of the image of American supremacy and exceptionalism and/or the image of the enemy is a permanent fixture of the history of the USA.

A. „Shining City on a Hill" (John Winthrop) - "Last best hope of earth" (Abraham Lincoln) - The liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson

The origin of American mission consciousness can be linked to the beginnings of colonialism in the 17th century. A puritan lawyer from a rich mercantilist family of England, governor of Massachusetts colony and later state, John Winthrop is associated with the incorporation into American self-determination of the "Shining City on a Hill" from the quotation from the Gospel According to

Matthew. The metaphor was used for the Puritan community of the 'new home' and the colony they founded, Massachussets, by John Winthrop in a speech onboard Arabella. The original biblical text - "You are the light of the world. A town built on a hill can not be hidden " (Mattew 5:14) - implies selective consciousness in itself.

The XX. century's US policy shifted the image of the "Shining City" to the symbol of the United States as an icon of the founding city community, where immigrants could restore their lives and "build" themselves from scratch again.

On 9 January 1961, President-elect John F. Kennedy, whose family is from Massachusetts, quoted Winthrop during an address delivered to the General Court of Massachussets: „We must always consider … that we shall be as a city upon a hill—the eyes of all people are upon us". And he continued: „Today the eyes of all people are truly upon us—and our governments, in every branch, at every level, national, state and local, must be as a city upon a hill—constructed and inhabited by men aware of their great trust and their great responsibilities." [1]

President Ronald Reagan referred to the same event and image on the eve of his election in 1980 and in his January 11, 1989, farewell speech to the nation, According to the latter:"I have spoken of the shining city all my political life, but I don't know if I ever quite communicated what I saw when I said it. But in my mind it was a tall, proud city built on rocks stronger than oceans, wind-swept, God-blessed, and teeming with people of all kinds living in harmony and peace; a city with free ports that hummed with commerce and creativity." [2]

/A Plus Addendum: a book written in 1997 by Michael Reagan (adopted son of the president) on Ronald Reagan's Vision is entitled "The City on a Hill: Fulfilling Ronald Reagan's Vision for America"./

U.S. Senator Barack Obama also made reference to the topic in his commencement address on June 2, 2006 at the University of Massachusetts Boston. He highlighed the possibility for everyone to excercise: „It was right here, in the waters around us, where the American experiment began. As the earliest settlers arrived … they dreamed of building a City upon a Hill… I see students that have come here from over 100 different countries, believing like those first settlers that they too could find a home in this City on a Hill—that they too could find success in this unlikeliest of places") [3]

All the speeches were in the shining original city on a hill, of course, at one of the first colonies where immigrants could restart their lives and "build" themselves from scratch again.

The next slogan of the American mission is from Abraham Lincoln, one of the most influential presidents, who spoke of the United States as "the last best hope of earth ").

His annual speech in Congress in 1862 was given in the darkest cycle of the Civil War. On 22 September 1862, President Abraham Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, which set a date for the freedom of more than 4 million black slaves in the United States and recasted the Civil War as a fight against slavery. On December 1, one month before signing the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln sent a long message to Congress which was largely routine, but also proposed controversial measures such as voluntary colonization of slaves and compensated emancipation: „In *giving* freedom to the *slave*, we *assure* freedom to the *free* -- honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth**"**[4]

After Lincoln's speech in 1862, he received the necessary support and the North, the unionists, won the civil war against the confederates.

Prior to the Civil War, American public opinion held that any one who was too close to the complete abolition of slavery in politics lost elections.

An extremely eloquent speaker, Lincoln, who originated from a baptist family that was morally opposed to slavery, and for whom one of his life's most impressionable experiences was seeing a slave market in New Orleans, however, in the decade before his presidency in 1858 said the following in his world-famous „House Divided Speech":

"I think this government can not remain permanently half-slavish and half free. I do not want the Union to break up, and I do not want the house to collapse, but I think its division will cease. It will be either completely one or the other. "[5]

After a year of presidental election, abolicionist republican editor Horace Greeley of the highly influential New York Tribune 'fell for the ploy', and Lincoln had no other choice than refute it directly in a shrewd letter of August 22, 1862. Although he said he personally wished all men could be

free, on the other hand he stated that the primary goal of his actions as the U.S. president was that of preserving the Union:

„My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that."[6]

President Lincoln's name is related to the emergence of the Emancipation Proclamation, the abolition of slavery and at the same time his persistence remained consistent to the survival of the Union as the main driving force in the question of slavery as well.

Woodrow Wilson, the Democratic President, who entered office in 1913, also represented the tradition of American idealism and mission consciousness, and his foreign policy, or at least its rhetoric, became a pattern to follow for almost every successor. He wanted to base America's foreign policy on the highest humanistic ideals. As president, in his second annual message of 1914, the voice of Americans was defined as the voice of peace, hope and freedom among the peoples of the world.[7]

To his name and to Wilsonism, his liberal internationalism is bound by the literature to the breakup of the American politics of isolationism based on the Monroe doctrine, which is essentially a realpolitical conception of foreign policy. (Together with Thomas Jefferson, Wilson is usually included among the devotees of global aspirations without war).

His principles were a peace-oriented foreign policy, national self-determination, settlement of serious disputes in international bodies, and the popularization of American democracy. It can be stated that his ideas encompass all aspects of soft power theory and its various mechanisms.

Kissinger once said that when he compared Wilson to Roosevelt, who in foreign policy was always mindful of the balance of power policy and geopolitical challenges, that we remember Roosevelt's achievements a hundred years from now, but it was Wilson who shaped American thinking.

Among others, as Suzanne Nossel hightlighted in her essay on smart power, „more than two decades after the failure of Woodrow Wilson's attempt to build a stable international order, his liberal internationalist vision helped Franklin Roosevelt rally the United States and its allies to vanquish fascism." (Nossel 2004: 132)

Wilson's "added value" can be identified in two areas. For the first time since the country's existence, the president linked the security of the United States to the security of the rest of the world; or in other words, introduced the doctrine that the United States can not feel safe until the world as a whole is safe. This borderless perception of security was then overridden by a number of successors on both sides of the political spectrum, and several analysts believe that this way of thinking has hindered Washington several times from making reasonable compromises.

The other aspect was the attempt to transform the international order based on the Kantian vision.

Woodrow Wilson stood for a "peace without victory" as far as the eve of peace talks following World War I. The president wanted to replace the traditional (European) balance of power policy of immoral system with a system based on international law and institutions. In the words of his address to the Senate of 1917: „The question upon which the whole future peace and policy of the world depends is this: is the present war a struggle for a just and secure peace, or only for a new balance of power, who will guarantee, who can guarantee, the stabe equilibrium of the new arrangement? Only a tranquil Europe can be a stable Europe. There must be not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organised rivalries, but an organised common peace."[8]

The League of Nations was proposed to be the basic institution of the system for the postwar warranties in his fourteen points published in January 1919. Prior to the final point on the establishment of the League of Nations, there were still about some international fundamental rights such as, full freedom of navigation of the seas or the nation's self-determination; as well as the consideration of ethnic considerations, the abolition of secret diplomacy, decomissioning, and the restoration of the sovereignty of occupied territories. (Wilson received a Nobel Prize for Peace in Efforts to Establish the League of Nations in 1919.)

However liberal internationalism of Wilson did not receive sufficient support in politics either abroad or domestically. Wilson's points were regarded as a negotiating ground, but were not actually taken into account in the negotiations. The post-war peace treaties stipulated that the winners placed all responsibility on the losers and forced them into seriously punitive agreements. Ironically, Wilson

led the American delegation that took part in drawing up the peace treaties. (Several analysts believe that the 14-point principles did not prevail as a result of a bad tactics of Wilson's delegation in the peace negotiations that sought allies on party political grounds.)

The US Congress did not approve the peace treaty or the Statute of the League of Nations. Wilson's dream of the League of Nations did not materialize and thereby the first attempt to translate the mission envisaged by Jefferson and Lincoln into reality failed. The events in the US Senate greatly contributed to the president's nervous breakdown and subsequent nerve paralysis, after which he was confined him to a wheelchair and withdrew from public view until his death (February 3, 1924).

B. The intersections of American and European French anti-militarism between the two world fires

American opponents of the League of Nations, largely isolationists, rejected military and political commitment in peacetime (contrary to the post-war military-security "blockade"). However, they advocated US economic and financial activity abroad in the spirit of the Hamiltonian traditions. It was partially thanks to the efforts of Aristide Briand, the French statesman christened „Pélerin de la Paix" ('Pilgrim of Peace'). The prevenient step of the process, which can be regarded as one of the premonitory signs of French soft power strategy, started with an American loan was offered to Germany in 1924 under the Dawes Plan framework to pay the irrationally high reparations to the United States, Britain and France, which ammounted to double Germany's GDP. This could be considered a peace-orientated security policy. (Domestic political antecedents: the failure of the Ruhr country's invasion of France in 1923 brought about the collapse of French aspirations of hegemony over Europe via power politics. In the wake of the Ruhr Crisis, Briand's more conciliatory style became more acceptable, and he returned to the Quai d'Orsay in 1925 after Raymond Poincaré's three-years bellicose politics. He would remain foreign minister until his death in 1932. During this time, he was a member of 14 cabinets, three of which he headed himself.)

The Briand-Stresemann pact of 1925 between France and Germany, that declared the inviolablility of borders brought both leaders a Nobel Peace Prize and significant détente between the states. (Germany (among others) was admitted to the League of Nations in 1926.)

The French - *'earliest'* soft power - peace policy continued during the next few years, and the Kellog-Briand Pact between France and the United States in 1928 represented the culmination of European détente between the two world wars. Under the convention, the parties condemned war as means of resolving international conflicts, except in the case of legitimate self-defense. (59 countries quickly joined the initiative, in the belief of establishing a truly functional moral forum alongside the League of Nations).

After the Dawes Plan expired in 1929 and with it the favorable international environment that it enabled followed by the outbreak of the global economic crisis, Aristide Briand championed the creation of an united, more precisely common, economic policy for Europe, to be directed by the European Conference, to which all government delegate a representative. Briand was ahead of his time and most contemporary leading politicians considered his plans a naive dream and his death in 1932 prevented the determination of whether French, European politics could have avoided to sliding into a new world war.

(It is obviously symbolic that in Quai d'Orsay, the location of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stands the monument of Aristide Briand. It can be called the monument of peace, among its inscriptions, a part of his famous speech in the Leage of Nation in 1926: „in the shadow cannons, machine guns and mourning veils, here is the time and place for arbitration, compromise, peace. " (" ... Arrière les canons, les mitrailleuse, les voiles de deuil, Place an arbitrage, a conciliation, a la paix! ")
The United States, meanwhile, - not a small part as a result of technological innovations and inventions of the second industrial revolution - grew into the world's leading industrial and financial power. While US politics and security policy, were characterized by continuing American isolationism between the two world wars, this was not the case for economic policy.

In the terrain of "soft power" as later conceptualised by Joseph Nye, however, American was unconstrained by the isolationism: that was the beginning of the march of the American creed and promulgation of American high and (mostly) popular culture to an incredible extent. From the myths of the "Wild West", trhough the „wooden hut to the White House" democratic equality of opportunity

and "rags to riches" success stories, Americans broadcast such images of their society and economy to huge masses worldwide. The stereotypes of the "country of unlimited possibilities", the "land of abundance", which can be traced back to the colonial period, did not promise people suitable living conditions in the distant future (as did communism) but in the present.

C. The American mission during the Cold War and soft power[1]

After World War II, the image of cultural factors, including states' self-image and images of other states, became more important than ever in foreign policy.

The reason has, on one hand, a theoretical background. In the last years of the World War I. two new foreign policy philosophies have become ever more decisive: liberal internationalism (Wilsonism) and proletarian internationalism. After 1945, the representatives of the two ideologies gained a hegemonic position within their own sphere of interest. This kind of reallocation of power in international relations led to a more prominent role of ideological opposition, then to ideological warfare. The central issue of the Cold War for the American side was who will win the struggle for "hearts and minds" became decisive in the struggle against communist ideology.

Another reason for the appreciation of cultural factors is a security factor. In the era of the Cold War, technological progress, especially in military technology, the emergence and rapid development of nuclear weapons resulted in a new kind of stability, the principle of mutually assured destruction (MAD). It was in the interest of both parties to deal with conflicts that arose on the terrain of "soft" power. Armed conflicts were used to settle disputes exclusively in countries with modest means that did not threaten the international order - and were naturally ideologically imbued.

On the other hand, instead of the "Empire of Liberty" of Jefferson and, essentially, of Wilson, at least from 1947, from the beginning of the Truman's containment policy, a "national security empire" was considered to be a traditional concept in which security considerations have overridden the liberal principles in both foreign and domestic politics.

The American leadership carried out a multilateral revolution immediately after World War II, taking into account the realities. Leading American theoreticians of international relations, from Henry Morgenthau, to Reinhold Niebuhr, to Walter Lippmann, belonged to the realist school of the discipline and warned that the United States would commit itself beyond its financial potential - the "Lippmann-gap". To fill the "gap," Washington applied so-called co-operative hegemony, so as far as possible, it included its allies in implementing US global strategy, to enable mutual benefit. But the cautious approach of the realists to assuming foreign burdens split the US administration March 1947 (with Truman doctrine). Harry S. Truman's announcment that the USA will support countries worldwide threatened by communist expansion was seen by the realists as overstepping a commitment to defend US national interest. The Truman doctrine strengthened the tactics of American presidents in both domestic and foreign politics.

The hegemonic situation of the US against its European allies was ensured by the anti-colonial foreign policy that began with Roosevelt's presidency. Its purpose was to deprive the British of their colonial empire (and thereby great power status) and contributed to the demotion of France as an European power.

One of the most important features of American hegemony starting after 1945 was self-restraint; the American liberal world order meant to involve states belonging to the United States in the decision-making mechanism. Perhaps the best example of this is NATO, in which all the participants have equal voting rights in principle. Another key element of hegemony, the nature of the US as a military service provider, has also led to the fact that the capacity gap has become ever wider in the decades of NATO's existence. The consequence is a current political problem, the increasingly incompatible American and European allied military forces.

The biggest beneficiaries of the US military service sector were the two greatest enemies in World War II, Germany and Japan and, in the broader sense, Western Europe and the Far East, beside Japan, mainly South Korea and Taiwan. As a "Service Provider", Washington has drawn a military protective umbrella over these areas, under which the states concerned have previously been able to provide unforeseen resources for internal development and have previously created unprecedented welfare systems as beneficiaries of the US anti-communist strategy.

During the Cold War the US functioned as a security state. Washington selectively promoted democratic values in different countries and forums on the basis of power relations. The gap between interests and values has been bridged by rhetoric of various US administrations; the only exception perhaps being Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger, who were more open than others to power relations and realized that the world was polarizing, for they were criticized sharply by both liberal and conservative sides.

Washington has also shifted to "positive" (offensive) tactics on the most basic tools of "soft power" in the area of dissemination of American values and institutions abroad.

The American authorities, the National Security Council and the CIA, coordinated the highest psychological warfare in the early 1950s, including radio broadcasts (Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe) and cultural organizations opposed to communist values, publications and events (leftists as well), sponsored by the CIA-funded Congress for Cultural Freedom.

One of the CIA's most successful programs was distributing books, in which hundreds of thousands of volumes were distributed each year for decades - officially different publishing companies - for intellectuals engaged/living in communist domination; the business certainly contributed greatly to the "velvet transitions" throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Over the years by Rockefeller, Ford, and most recently Fulbright exchanges, thousands of Central and Eastern European scientists and researchers spent shorter and longer periods in the United States and have established personal and institutional relationships with American colleagues and institutions. One of the unwavering goals of the programs was to make the visitors see with their own eyes the political, economic and social benefits of the American model (and at times inevitablely of disadvantages as well).

In addition to high-brow culture, demand for and distribution of American popular culture (also known as "low brow culture") played a very important role worldwide. American political leadership has also recognized the importance of popular culture of young people during the ideological Cold War and, the US Information Office (USIS), which acts as a government agency, has been trying to bring pop and jazz ensembles and performers to communist states; while the aforementioned radio stations sponsored by the government broadcasted American pop music products.

The theoretical foundations of consciousness may have been elaborated by Arnold J. Toynbe in Washington, who once remarked that in general, more "digestible" elements of a culture can more effectively penetrate into another culture. American popular culture, however, did convey, at least indirectly, such American values as individualism, unlimited freedom or the uninterrupted search of new. „Wild West" - the struggle between good and evil and permanent emergence of the good - has become to some extent the symbol of America.

Within hegemonic systems, there is also a need for shared values and myths that, in addition to political, economic and military interests, also adhere to the hegemonic sphere of a state based on values. This can be one of the explanations of the so-called "value-based" foreign policy of the United States albeit partly driven by self-interest.

Exceptionalism-consciousness attributed to the United States, on one hand, served as a tool of legitimation for the steps required in the process of real-politics and promoting the economic interests of the United States. International organisations helped spread American values, which in turn fueled an appetite for American products. Trade enhanced political influence, and political influence helped further extend American values.

On the other hand, this exceptionism-consciousness indicated the hope that some of these steps, which undeniably caused painful human suffering can serve noble ideas. John F. Kennedy understood that to effectively counter the Soviet threat, Washington had not only to be tough on Moscow, but also to champion self-determination, democracy, and human rights. In his inaugural address, he argued that by fighting for the people „in the huts and villages" of the world, the United States would help itself, because „if a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich." [2] Kennedy established the U.S. Agency for International Developmnet to promote such lofty American ideals.

Kennedy's predecessor, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, attempted most prominently to rule out using military force to uphold peace policy during the Cold War. Following this policy, Nobel Peace Prize winner Jimmy Carter succeeded in pursuing reconciliation and disarmament policies at least until the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

This study clearly calssifies Eisenhower's strategy as a dogma of soft power. In 1956, campaigning with the slogan "Peace and Prosperity", Eisenhower won re-election and in 1957, in accordance with his "atom for peace" proposal, 62 countries set up the International Atomic Energy Agency, an international organization overseeing and developing nuclear energy. (The Vienna-based organization and its then-president received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005). In his famous Farewell Address, Eisenhower expressed his belief that the United States' „leadership and prestige depend, not merely upon our unmatched material progress, riches and military strength but on how we use our power in the interest of world peace and human betterment."

Speech is, however, primarily relevant because the highly decorated general and Republican icon drew attention to the danger posed by the newly created "US-military industrial complex" to human rights and peaceful managment of situations. In those years the US already spent more on military security annually than the net income of all United States corporations. Eisenhower described the Cold War period as a follows: "We face a hostile ideology global in scope, atheistic in character, ruthless in purpose and insidious in method ..." and warned about what he saw as unjustified government spending proposals and continued with a warning that "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex [3]

In American political thinking, the principle of the peaceful use of nuclear energy as an instrument of promoting peace gained importance. The 1985 Gorbachev-Reagan meeting of Geneva, the first meeting of the two presidents, which can be considered the beginning of the end of the bipolar system and the Cold War, a symbolic element of which was the plan to establish jointly such a reactor. (Ruffini 2015) The December summits of the following years partly focused on mutual (nuclear) decommissioning.

D. The „Great Strategy" of the USA and its doctrines after the Cold War: gamble, interplay, merge and conflate of values and interests (1989-2004)

Changes in the global balance of power after the Cold War did not involve many foreign policy actions that could be cited as examples of soft power, but they have led to foreign policies that have become indicators of a conceptual analysis that is based not on military or 'conquering' economic power but on value-based attractiveness and cooperation.

The relatively rapid disintegration of the global bipolar balance has caused many challenges for the United States. After the termination of Soviet "gendarme role", which ensured a certain order in the countries of its sphere of influence, the US became the world's only "sheriff". Power vacuums opened geographically significant spaces to the Americans.

Washington's decision, in a position that has been seemingly unilateral across different governments, was to take advantage of a geopolitically beneficial situation to the fullest extent, and try to fill these spaces.

In spite of this, the fundamental consensus in its foreign and security policy during the Cold War - in which strategic goals were given, and the debate was mostly about tactics - was missing. The confrontation of four schools of international relations dominated political thinking in the two decades following the Cold War.

"Internacionalist realists" recommended selective lobbying in foreign territories. "Conservative realists" pursued a policy of resolving domestic political issues. Neoconservatives and liberal "internationalists" spearheaded pro-active politics. According to the two latter schools, Washington must take advantage of the favorable international situation, by spreading liberal democracy and market-based economies, but according to the neoconservative conception, by means of the use of force, while liberal internationalists focused on "soft" means.

Efforts to globalize American influence, however, have hidden the roots of Pax Americana's fall. The hegemon after the Second World War was no longer able to provide such benefits as before to its allies as it had to share its resources much more widely, so its available resources and new obligations were not in direct proportion with each other, and in many cases they had to be re-grouped. Meanwhile, the contours of a common world view between the United States and its closest allies became blurred.

With the disappearance of the supposed or real external existential threat, the role of the American multi-faceted security net has been devalued by the leaders of several key states. The rapport of Germany is a prime example. While Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl supported Washington's policies in spite of negative public opinion in Germany and even if they had personal doubts, Gerhard Schröder won an election by standing against the US-led Iraqi intervention of the „coalition of willing" and thereby sided with Moscow against the US, which was previously unimaginable.
The role of the primary Euro-Atlantic organization, NATO, in post-Cold War American governments' policies is a good indicator of to what extent those governments planned a unilateral or multilateral positioning for America.

After the markedly military role of NATO during the Cold War, the political role of the primarily military organization grew. Along with the fact that NATO's most important mission was (and is) various multilateral military actions, the era was characterized by the so-called „peace dividend" (ie. a reduction in defense spending) imposed by the majority of the members of the organization and thereby an increase in the "capability gap" between America and its allies, which potentially contributed to an increase in the "distance" between the two sides of the Atlantic in terms of military budgets.

The minimalist conception of the Atlantic alliance also found support in American political discourse during the period – „the mission determines the coalition, and the coalition is not to determine the mission" to quote Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2006 under George W. Bush - a concept that moves from a multilateral toward a more unilateral Westphalian's self-help security policy.

On the other hand, the allies wishing to escape militarism argued that Americans were thinking too statically – by a cold-war mentality - when they focused on military engagement, or at least did not rule out new responses to new security policy challenges. These questions appeared to have economic, social, even religious and cultural roots, and, in their view are impossible to deal with militarily (the first Clinton administration was also inclined *initially* to replace geopolitics with a geo-economic strategy.)

Ultimately, however, the USA tried to accomplish the hegemonic strategy triad of dissuasion - reassurance - nonproliferation. That is, by monopolizing the greater part of the world's military power -- a unilateral ambition in itself -- and, by providing security to others, Washington wanted to encourage certain of its allies to reduce their armament.

All these efforts were part of the „Great Strategy" that was also implemented during the Cold War period. This grand strategy or high strategy – according to the applied definition of this study - comprises the "purposeful employment of all instruments of power available to a security community" (Gray 2007: 283). The traditional elements of the startegy, like creation of liberal world order, market economy, protection of the country's territory and its population, and counter-balancing of the dangerous Great Powers, were supplemented after 9/11 with the conception of the preemptive actions/war against rogue states and the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security.

From the strategies of the examined period, the ideals closest to the principles of the soft power analytical concept were the new world order strategy of George H. W. Bush, in addition to the non-militaristic democracy promotion strategies of the Clinton administration and its diplomatic role complemented by its experiments for peacebuilding (via multilateral alliances, setting up a global economic organization and humanitarian initiatives.)

It should be noted – as set forth in his memoirs - that Bush was apt to realistic pragmatic approaches and he consistently avoided emphasizing the universal validity of American values in his contacts with foreign leaders (Bush - Scowcrot 1998)

In his Inagural Address of January 20, 1989, he also highlighted the importance of the totalitarian era's passing and emphasized practical freedom rather than the importance of disseminating American universal values: "We live in a peaceful and prosperous time, but we can make it better. For a new breeze is blowing, and a world refreshed by freedom seems reborn. For in man's heart, if not in fact, the day of the dictator is over. The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom stands ready to push on. There is new ground to be broken, and new action to be taken. There are times when the

future looks thick as a fog; you sit and wait, hoping the mists will lift and reveal the right path. But this is a time when the future looks like a door that you can walk right through into a room called tomorrow ... A President is neither Prince nor Pope, and I do not look for a window on men's souls. In fact, I yearn for a greater tolerance, and easygoingness about each other's attitudes and way of life. " [1]

George H. W Bush gave his much-quoted "Towards a New World Order" speech before both houses of Congress on September 11, 1990. He outlined the same principles that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev made in his historic speech addressed the UN General Assembly on December 7, 1988, - Bush's speech may be a homage to that, or at least a response – but Bush approached the principles from pragmatism.

In 1988, Mikhael Gorbachev was not only concerned with practical steps to improve US-Soviet relations (reducing the number of Soviet armed forces), but also outlined an ideal post-Cold War world, the most important elements of which were non-ideological international relations, the unified world economy and wide cooperation ranging from security issues to environmental protection. [2]

Bush cited the Persian Gulf War, among other topics, as an opportunity to promote a "New World Order" in his aforementioned speech, in which he made no less than a new attempt to reconcile the idealistic (Wilsonian) and realistic (Roosveltian) lines of American foreign policy traditions. According to his thesis, ideology has to be removed from international ties, violence must be replaced by the rule of law in international relations (the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq occurred a month before the speech), cooperation must dominate the US-Soviet relations and the Soviet Union must be integrated to the international community.

Line-by-line: "Hundreds of generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while thousands of wars raged across the span of human endeavor. Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect of the rights of the weak. This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and other leaders from Europe, the Gulf, and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come. " [3]

The new world order of Gorbachev and Bush, however, has been operating for a very short time, only the Gulf War of 1991 has brought such extensive co-operation and synergy of great powers from United Nations' cooperation to military engagement, what the two leaders mentioned earlier as determining factors of the (desired) post-Cold War era. The outbreak of the Gulf War resulted in a regional containment policy based on Iran and Iraq counterbalancing each other.

Bill Clinton's foreign and security policy ideas were based on a purely Wilsonian principle: the spread of democracy, not always with Wilson's means alone. (His speech in San Francisco in 1999 is considered to have summarized the Clinton doctrine: "Our first challenge is to build a more peaceful 21st century world. To that end, we're renewing alliances that extend the area where wars do not happen, and working to stop the conflicts that are claiming lives and threatening our interests right now… *The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a difference, we must be prepared to do so.")*[4]

Conservative realist critics have consistently attacked this strategy, which applied doctrinal promotion of democracy and military intervention in places where the United States has no vital interest. Clinton's strategy was attacked not only due to a perceived or real lack of US vital interest, but occasionally for nation-building interventions. The most cited example of which could be the intervention in Somalia, which ended in tragedy and a bloodbath. On the other hand, Clinton ordered U.S. military intervention in the Bosnian and Kosovo Wars (the first concluded with the Dayton Agreement), signed the Iraq Liberation Act, an Act to establish a program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq – notwithstanding, the Act was cited in October 2002 to argue for the authorization of military force against the Iraqi government -, assisted the Oslo I Accord of 2003 and participated in the 2000 Camp David Summit to advance the Israeli-Palestinian peace process furthermore assisted the Northern Ireland peace process. The last, Northern Ireland peace treaty ended with agreement (the Good Friday (or Belfast) Agreement of 1998 is considered to end most of the violence of the Troubles and led to subsequent supporting political developments.)

One of the most important elements of Clinton's National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement published in February 1995 was the dissemination of democracy under the leadership of the US, which committed the United States to peacekeeping and peacekeeping missions, preferably in a multilateral framework. The US also committed itself to projects that promote environmental protection, sustainable development and American competitiveness and access to foreign markets.

Bill Clinton's initial policy focus - and his victorious election strategy - was on domestic policy, the economy.

The famous "It's the economy, stupid" slogan was coined by James Carville as a campaign strategist for Bill Clinton's successful 1992 presidential campaign. Carville's original phrase was meant for the internal audience of Clinton's campaign workers as one of the three messages to focus on, the other two messages being "Change vs. more of the same" and "Do not forget health care." Clinton's campaign advantageously used the then-prevailing recession in the United States as one of the campaign's means to successfully unseat George H. W. Bush. The new slogan was also applied to foreign relations at the beginning, replacing the geopolitical approach with geo-economics and the need to build a global liberal economic system (with American influence).

Clinton presided over one of the longest periods of peacetime economic expansion in American history and signed into law the North American Free Trade Agreement (1993) - Bush Senior also signed - and the President also was a catalyst for the establishment of a global reform of trade liberalization, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the World Trade Organization (WTO) (1995).

NATO enlargement in 1999 also targeted the extension of the "security zone", and the same year's intervention in Kosovo strengthened Washington's primary partner and ally, Europe, as well as the Washington-European alliance. A long-lasting war in Europe's geopolitically, ethnically and religiously sensitive area would have weakened the "Old Continent" and its ability to be a US partner in solving a number of global security issues (eg. water security, international drug trafficking).

The American mission statement was not far from the mindset of Clinton and his administration. The second Foreign Minister of the Clinton administration, Madeleine K. Albright, spoke about the United States as an "indispensable nation," while according to Al Gore, Bill Clinton's vice president, Democratic presidential candidate in 2000 and environmentalist (for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Price in 2007), the "natural leader" of the world.

The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2000 entitled "NSS for a New Century" by the Clinton administration can be seen as a mission statement of a hegemon (with an unilateral role): "The United States remains the world's most powerful force for peace, prosperity and the universal values of democracy and freedom. Our nation's central challenge - and our responsibility - is to sustain that role by seizing the opportunities of this new global era for the benefit of our own people and people around the world ... I am confident that our military is and will continue to be able to carry out our national strategy and meet America's defense commitments around the world.

To be secure, we must not only have a strong military; we must also continue to lead in limiting the military threat to our country and the world. We continue to work vigilantly to curb the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles to deliver them. We are continuing the START process to reduce the Russian and American nuclear arsenals, while discussing the modification of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to allow for development of a national missile defense against potential rogue state attacks. And we remain committed to obtaining Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and to bringing this crucial agreement into force."[5]

After two cycles in the presidency, Bill Clinton was replaced by George W. Bush on January 20, 2001.

During George W. Bush's presidential election campaign, he emphasized restraint and criticized the Clinton administration among others for its military-humanitarian interventions.

The conservative approach is summarized in an article in Foreign Affairs magazine in the first months of 2000 by Condoleezza Rice, one of the most prominent foreign policy advisers of the presidential candidate, later his national security advisor and Secretary of State (Rice 2000). Rice cited the Clinton administration's lack of consistent, clear criteria for assessing US national interest, more precisely, that the US national interest was replaced by "humanitarian" concern, and criticized its democratization and nation-building policy, which often employed military force.

If the United States is not prepared to address the underlying political conflict and to know whose side it is on, the military may end up separating warring parties for an indefinite period. Sometimes one party (or both) can come to see the United States as the enemy. Because the military cannot, by definition, do anything decisive in these "humanitarian" crises, the chances of misreading the situation and ending up in very different circumstances are very high. (This was essentially the problem of "mission creep" in Somalia.)

In addition, the security adviser considered it imperative to develop post-Cold War, more adaptable military forces for the 21st century in the age when "America's military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability." While she considered international organizations and conventions to be indispensable for promoting the national interests of the US, she strongly criticized the Clinton's administration when it was operating under "illusory norms of international behavior", for example in the case of the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. "Since 1992, the United States has refrained unilaterally from testing nuclear weapons. It is an example to the rest of the world but it does not tie its own hands "in perpetuity" if testing becomes necessary again " (as well as judging ratification of the Kyoto Convention as a fatal mistake because the US cannot afford to ratify the convention when developing countries and mainly China did not). (Rice 2000)

Richard Haas, a spokesman for the Bush administration, characterized the foreign policy of the former government as "à la carte multilateralism".

After the presidential election, the Bush administration initially moved with great caution on the international stage. The first State of Union speech in 2001 focused on bugetary issues, the economy and, above all, the importance of education.

In spite of this, the pioneering role of military development and the primacy of military forces - which is the guarantee of the guarantor's global peace and stability – as the above mentioned essay of Condoleezza Rice pointed out – suddenly multiplied.

On September 11, 2001 - on the 11th anniversary of President Bush's "Towards a New World Order" congressional speech -, the United States continental area was attacked for the first time since 1814, including hitting the targets of the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, one of the best-known US economic symbols, and the Pentagon, the seat of military power. (The fourth hijacked plane that crashed over Pennsylvania was a suspected of targeting of either the White House or the Congress - the strongholds of American governmental executive and legislative power, respectively.)

In the aftermath of the attacks, in almost unprecedented speed on October 26 and with a majority in both houses of Congress the US PATRIOT Act ("Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001")[6] was passed, which, among other things, made it much easier for the federal authorities to monitor inhabitants of the US.

The overwhelming majority of the USA's public opinion approved of the US Patriot Act. In the history of the superpower and the country, it chose for the second time security over the most fundamental and pronounced American value of freedom (the first time being during the Cold War, during which America was a security state.)

On 13 December, 2001, 'in a move that reflected what President Bush said was "a vastly different world,"' the administration formally announced that the United States had withdrawn from the Anti-Balladic Missile (AMT) Treaty that US signed with the Soviet Union in 1972.

Behind this move, the ideas and experiments of the Reaganian missile shield were rejuvenated. The administration had been thinking of a (national) missile defense system that would provide "safe" protection to the United States and its allies having fewer weapons of mass destruction, predominantly nuclear weapons. In response, concern was rised by Russia and others internationally that the US intended to increase its first strike capacity. (Neylan 2001)

The 2002 and 2003 State of the Union Addresses of George W. Bush and his much quoted speech at West Point of 2002 outlined the elements of his foreign and security policy.

In the field of foreign policy, the president first announced a "crusade" campaign against extremist Islamists which attacked and partially undermined the international co-operation. Subsequently, the term "Global War on Terror" was coined. The phrase "Axis of the Evil", highlighed in his State of the Union speech of 2002, cited the manichean view of the world that has been present in varying degrees since the inception of US public opinion and rhetoric again emphasized American exceptionalism (this

inclination, of varying intensity, is a characteristic of all hegemons). In legitimately critized states, such fundamentalist religious rhetoric led to negative reactions.

The goal was to overthrow an actually Neo-Wilsonian principle, the repression of the Afghan Taliban and Saddam Hussein by launching a democratic wave of transformation that could have created lasting peace in the region. According to this vision, the only democratic state in the region, Israel would be surrounded by democratic Arab states. (It is worth noting, that president Bush, in his two speeches of 2002, stood up for the establishment of an independent and democratic Palestine – one of them was his famous call for a new Palestinian Leadership[7], the other was said during the autumn session of the United Nations General Assembly.)

Iraqi intervention preceded the publication of Natan Sharansky's foreign manifesto of 2004, but the intervention was implemented in the manifesto's spirit. The book, entitled „The Case of Democracy, The Power of Freedom to Overcome Tyranny and Terror", argues that the primary goal of American foreign policy, as well as that of the free world, should be the expansion of democracy. The book advocates a moral foeign policy based on the belief in the universality of freedom and human rights as well as expresses passionate and contraversial arguments against any compromise on the road of freedom.[8]

After liberating Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991, Bush Senior did not extend the campaign to pursue regime change in Iraq. In 2003, without broad international support, the "coalition of willing" under the leadership of Bush Junior intervened against Iraq based on an 'special' or 'individual' understanding of international law (Bush Doctrine).

E. The direct indicator of the emergence of soft power theory: the 2003 intervention in Iraq - the collision of ideologies

The messianic unilateralism of the Bush administration can be directly linked to a trend of neo-conservative ideology.

The neoconservative trend that emerged in the United States in the 1950s[1] and the two foreign policy trends of the 1970s developed partly in response -- the Nixonian - Kissingerian interest-based realist and Carterian human rights - idealist were among the trends that shaped foreign policy formulation of the 1980s. Neo-conservative ideologists stood behind the Neorealist policies of Ronald Reagan (primarily Paul Nitze, Eugene Rostov).

According to this ideology, in order to defeat communism the expression of American will and moral superiority was necessary, which took the form of the metaphor of the struggle between "Good" and the "Evil Empire".

During the 1990s, some neo-conservatives who later condemned the Bush administration's actions and distanced themselves from him, such as Francis Fukuyama, claimed that the United States has to use its military superiority to bring benevolent hegemony to strategically important parts of the world. (Fukuyama 2006: 226)

In 1997, a neoconservative think tank based in non-profit educational organisation – the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) – had been founded by William Kristol and Robert Kagan and has become a neoconservative think tank based in Washington D. C. that focused on United States foreign policy (dissolved in 2006). PNAC's stated goal was „to promote American global leadership. The organisation stated that the „American leadership is good both for America and the world", and thought to build support for „a Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity".[2]

After 9/11, the more radical neocons, William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol, one of the founders and most dominant figures of American neoconservatism), Robert Kagan and Charles Krauthammer took control of foreign policy in what Fukuyama called the "neoconservative moment".

In his speech at West Point Military Academy on 1 June 2002, George W. Bush announced the break of US foreign policy from its two principles of the Cold War, deterrence and containment. The key feature of the Bush Doctrine's postulation is that such Cold War concepts would not necesserily work against rouge states – states, which brutalize their own people and sqander their national resources for the personal gain of the ruler -, and are ineffective against terrorist organizations. („War on terror will not be won on the defensive.")[3]

In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Bush Doctrine held that the US will no longer make a distinction between terrorists and those who shelter them.

In the name of a policy called „anticipatory self-defence", early, direct and preventive, "preemptive" strikes should be used to prohibit the development of mass destruction capabilities before they could be used against the United States or its allies. On this basis, the United States is obliged to strike "rogue states" or terrorists if acceptable multilateral solutions are not possible. („Our security will require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive actions when necessary to defend our liberty and defend our lives.")[4]

The initiators of the intervention a year later probably believed that it would serve the global public good.

Many opinion leaders opined that the Bush administration ignored international public opinion and the legitimacy of multilateral institutions. The neoconservatives and the Bush administration argued that international system does not recognize legimitacy so much ex ante as ex post and that due to the weakness of the collective decision-making of multilateral institutions, the United States has to act first and gain approval later.

The coalition led by George W. Bush, Tony Blair and José Maria Aznar launched the four-week intervention in Iraq despite protests not only by some media but also the UN Security Council and several influential powers.

The global geopolitical weight of France, the motherland of diplomacy, is partly determined by its military force for peacekeeping and other actions. Nevertheless, France's refusal to take part in the 2003 US intervention in Iraq remains a significant weapon. The speech of Dominique de Villepin, then French Foreign Minister, at the United Nations Security Council on 14 February 2003, was one of the highlights against the intervention. In November 2016 the memoir of Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Interior Affairs, and finally Prime Minister under Jacgues Chirac entitled "Mémoire de Paix pour les temps de Guerre" ('Peace Memories for Times of War'). In the book, Villepin emphasizes the danger of terrorism but opposes the neo-conservative view (such as that democratization by military force is legitimate or even desirable) and draws attention to the role of France a possible peace mediator based on its history. (Villepin 2016)

Gerhard Schröder did not support America in the United Nations Security Council, making Bush administration's foreign policy one of the elements of his re-election campaign. Further, an ad hoc Paris-Berlin-Moscow "Axis" was formed against Washington.

In the following year, in 2004, Joseph Nye published "Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics".

CONCLUSION

Both history and the recent past of the United States have demonstrated that the use of military means to achieve objectives against ideological competitors is extremely expensive and the use of more cost-effective methods of lobbying and influencing have been and are necessary.

The elimination of the ideological confrontation or alternating strategies are primarily effective by means of constructive approaches to the standpoints of the parties rather than hostile images backed by military threat and rhetoric.

NOTES

I/A. The social treaty theory of the XVII. century, or theories of two British parents of modern political thinking: Thomas Hobbes and John Locke

1. Exhibition "Charles II: Art & Power" at the Queen's Gallery, Buckingham Palace of London - 8 December 2017 – 13 May 2018 – has explored the rich material world of Charles II. and how the visual and decorative arts had been used by the King to reinforc his legitimacy as a monarch after a decade of Republican rule. The exhibition included over 220 paitings, drawings, books and works of art from the Royal Collection.
2. Manet, Pierre : An Intellectual History of Liberalism, 1995, New Jersey: Prinston University Press. Original release: Manet Pierre (1987): Histoire intellectuelle du liberalisme. Dix leboons Paris: Calmann-Lévy
3. First appearence of the phase by Hobbes was in his Latin work of 1647 published in Paris entitled „De Cive" ('On the citizen'). „De Cive" anticipates themes of the Leviathan.
4. Hobbes, Thomas: Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme & Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill, ed. by Ian Shapiro (2010) Chapter XIII. 9

I. The source of the today's Western ideals and value-system: the Enlightenment

I/B. The end of the XVIII. century: the overlapping of the two modern constitutions' principles of the USA and France and of the Peace Theory of Prussian Immanuel Kant

1. Explained by Immanuel Kant (1788): Kritik der praktiscen Vernunft; English version: Critique of Practical Reason
   Internet accession: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Critique_of_Practical_Reason
2. Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View; In: Beck, Lewis White ed., trans.(1963): Kant: On History.
3. Kant, Immanuel: Perpetual Peace. Translated by Lewis White Beck, 1957
4. more on this: Brunner, Otto; Conze, Werner; Koselleck, Reinhart (ed., 1972): Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, Brand 1, A-D Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta; in Hungarian language: Brunner at all. (1999): Demokrácia. Budapest: Jószöveg Műhely Kiadó

II. America's mission statement

II/A. „Shining City on a Hill" (John Winthrop) - "Last best hope of earth" (Abraham Lincoln) - The liberal internationalism of Woodrow Wilson

1. Kennedy, John F. (1961): „Address to Massachustts State Legistrature 9 January 1961" https://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/ohJztSnpV06qFJUT9etUZQ.aspx
2. Reagan, Ronald (1989): „Farewell Address to the Nation" http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29650
3. Obama, Barack (2006): „University of Massachusetts at Boston Commencement Address June 2, 2006" <http://obamaspeeches.com/074-University-of-Massachusetts-at-Boston-Commencement-Address-Obama-Speech.htm
4. Lincoln, Abraham (1862): Annual Message to Congress. December 1, 1862 **http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/congress.htm**
5. Lincoln, Abraham (1858): "A House Divided," Speech at Springfield, Illinois, June 16, 1858, *Collected Works*, Basler ed. 2:461.
6. Lincoln, Abraham (1862): Letter to Harace Greeley. Washington D.C., August 22, 1862 http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/greeley.htm
7. Wilson, Woodrow (1914): Second Annual Message. December 8, 1914 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29555
8. Wilson, Woodrow (1917): Address to the Senate (Janury 22, 1917) http://www.historycentral.com/documents/WilonSenate.html

C. The American mission during the Cold War and soft power

1. There is not possible to analyse the American foreign policy after the Cold War more accurately, sharper, more sensitively and critically, than Tamás Magyarics, Hungarian expert of international relations, former ambassador to USA does. I clearly follow his point of view in this chapter. (Magyarics 2012)
2. Kennedy, John F (1961): Inaugural Address. Washington, D.C., January 20, 1961 https://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Research-Aids/Ready-Reference/JFK-Quotations/Inaugural-Address.aspx
3. Eisenhower, Dwight D. (1961): Farewell Address http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/research/online_documents/farewell_address.html

II/D. **The „Great Strategy" of the USA and its doctrines after the Cold War: gamble, interplay, merge and conflate of values and interests (1989-2004)**

1. Bush, H. W. George (1989): Inaugural Address. January 20, 1989 at the West Front of the Capitol, Washington Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, *The American Presidency Project*. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16610
2. Gorbachev, Mikhael (1988): Address to the General Assembly of the United Nations https://alphahistory.com/coldwar/gorbachev-addresses-united-nations-1988
3. Bush, H. W. George (1990): Address to a joint session of Congress and the nation http://www.sweetliberty.org/issues/war/bushsr.htm
4. Clinton, Bill (1999): Remarks by the President on Foreign Policy. San Francisco, February 26, 1999 https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/clintfps.htm
5. National Security Strategy 2000. A National Security Strategy For A New Century. December, 1999 Washington: The White House http://nssarchive.us/national-security-strategy-2000-2/
6. „USA Patriot Act" https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-107publ56/html/PLAW-107publ56.htm
7. Bush, George W. (2002): President Bush Calls for New Palestinian Leadership. Washington: Office of the Press Secretary. June 24, 2002 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html
8. Sharansky (2004). ***The book was famously endorsed by United States then president George W. Bush***

II/E. The direct indicator of the emergence of soft power theory: the 2003 intervention in Iraq - the collision of ideologies

1. In 1950 a bipolar foreign policy interest group was established: the Committee on Present Danger (CPD). The stated single goal of the organisation was (and is) „to stiffen American resolve to confront the challenge presented by terrorism and the ideologies that drive it" through „education and advocacy". CPD website: <http://www.committeeonthepresentdanger.org/AboutUs/tabid/363/Default.aspx
2. More about PNAC : <https://web.archive.org/web/20131006055540/ http://www.newamericancentury.org/aboutpnac.htm
3. definition of rouge states: The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington: White House, September 2002, p. 14. (The strategy often cited as a definitive statement of the Bush Doctrine.)
4. President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point. United States Military Academy. West Point. New York. June 1, 2002 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html

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