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The Struggle for Faith in Islam: The Theory and Practice of *Jihad*

Handbooks of Islamic law discuss the questions of war under the entry of *jihad,*[1] which, however, does not mean that *jihad* is equivalent with war. Both the Qur'an and Islamic law use everyday words of the Arabic language to refer to armed combat, like *harb* (warfare) and *qital* (fight).[2] For peace, Islamic law does not use the two words most widely used to denote the state of lasting peace in the Arabic language. Though both *silm* and *salam* are used in the Qur'an, the primary source of law, commentators do not interpret either of them as peace. Instead Islamic law uses words that mean ceasefire (*hudna, muhadana*) or reconciliation (*sulh, musalaha*).[3]

Jihad *in Islamic law*

The meanings of jihad

The expression *jihad* derives from the word *jahd* or "effort", which refers to the fact that an effort is made to "fight" against somebody or something.[4] The corresponding verb is *jahada.*[5] This is the form that occurs most frequently in the Qur'an, while the number of occurrences of the noun form is only four. This term does not necessarily refer to armed combat, neither does it clearly refer to a holy fight against an external enemy or people of other faiths, this latter is simply one possible meaning of the word.[6]

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1 Both in books on law and in Hadith collections See, *e.g.* IBN QUDAMA, *al-Mughni,* vol. 10, pp. 364-567: *Kitab al-jihad* (The book of jihad), in which the author provides an explanation of traditions traced back to the Prophet, and in which *jihad* is exclusively used in the meaning of war. Also see: AL-MAWARDI, *al-Ahkam al-sultaniyya.* Chap. 4, "*Fi taqlid al-imara ala l-jihad*" (Appointing the commander at war), pp. 47-68.

2 On the difference between the expressions "war" and "effort" see the Qur'anic quotations later.

3 The cause of the difference between Qur'anic – legal usage and everyday usage is, on the one hand, the similarity between the words *salam* and *islam,* and, on the other hand, the fact that the former has a strong religious meaning: aside from "peace", it also means "salvation", "eternal peace". Peace made with the heathen, however, can only be temporary.

4 This arises from the morphological system of the Arabic language.

5 In a more correct transliteration: *jāhada,* with a long first "*a*".

6 Cf. KOLOCOTRONIS , *Islamic Jihad: An Historical Perspective*, p. 137.

Though Muslim and non-Muslim manuals introducing traditional Islam refer to *jihad* as the semi-official sixth pillar of Islam (besides the testimony of faith, prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage), Muslim religious works on Islam published in the mid-twentieth century, until as late as the 1980s, did not pay special attention to either the character of *jihad* as holy war or war in general.[7] So much so that one of the most outstanding theologians of the 20th century, Mahmud Shaltut, for decades the great sheikh of the Azhar mosque in Cairo, does not even make mention of the word *jihad* in his book of nearly five hundred pages, which has been annually republished since its publication. He only discusses war under the entry *harb,* in not more than one and a half pages, and even that discussion is preceded by an explication on Islam's general love of peace.[8] The word *jihad* has moved into the focus of attention only during the past three decades, coming to mean primarily religious war for both Muslim and non-Muslim audiences. An incident typical of the situation was the case in the early 1990s of the late Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Not long after the signing of the Oslo accord, in an address to South African Muslims,[9] Arafat mentioned the importance of *jihad,* and this caused great dissatisfaction among Israeli political circles in the context of the momentarily exceptionally peaceful Israeli-Palestinian relations. And Arafat, amid incredulous echoes from the world media, explained his speech in such a way that by *jihad* he had meant self-examination, overcoming the internal doubts we find in our souls, as, according to Islam, this is the *jihad akbar*, the major fight,[10] while the other, armed combat, is only the minor fight, the *jihad asghar*. The important thing here is not what Arafat really meant in that particular speech, but that his statement was actually in compliance with the authentic teachings of Islam.

Such occurrences should motivate us to try and learn as much as possible about this important concept, and to avoid basing any interpretation only on the extremist Muslim views of the past two-three decades.

The word jihad *in the Qur'an*

The word *jihad* occurs in the Qur'an four times, always in an indefinite position, i.e. not as a concept noun, but as an infinitive. It is up to our interpretation whether we translate it as 'making an effort' or we choose the word 'fighting', but in neither case it is possible to translate it as 'war' or 'holy war'.

Q. 9:24:[11] 'If your fathers, your sons, your brothers, your wives and your tribe, and wealth you have acquired, and commerce you fear will slacken, and dwellings you approve of are dearer to you than God and His messenger and *striving* in His way, wait

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[7] Of course, works that were written with the specific puspose to encourage participation in fighting are an exception.

[8] SHALTUT, *al-Islam: aqida wa-shari'a*, pp. 392-398, part 2 of chapter 6 deals with international relations, and imbedded in it are the questions of war and *jihad*.

[9] *Arafat's Johannesburg Speech*.

[10] For more details on this see, *e.g.* AL-SHINQITI, *Mawarid an-najah wa-masadir al-falah ala risalat Ibn Abi Zayd al-Qayrawani*, pp. 236 ff.: "the major *jihad* is the fight against the soul".

[11] Citations from the Qur'an are given in the translation of Alan JONES.

till God brings His command.'[12] Here the meaning of *jihad* is undoubtedly identical with following God, with Islam itself, and with any act carried out for the sake of Islam. However, for a Muslim to be able to make efforts for the sake of God, first he must accomplish the emigration (*hijra*), which the above verse is encouraging. In the explanation to the verse, al-Qurtubi provides the following so-called authentic (*sahih*) *hadith*: "Satan lay in ambush three times on the path of man (to prevent his advancement on his way to God). First, he lay in ambush on man's path to Islam and said to him: Why are you leaving your religion, your ancestors' religion? But man resisted him and reached Islam. Second, he lay in ambush on man's path to emigration (*hijra*), and asked him: Would you abandon your wealth and family? But man resisted him again and immigrated (to Medina). Finally, Satan lay in ambush on man's path of the struggle for God, and said to him: If you fight (on God's path), you will be killed, your wives will be married by others, and your wealth will be meted out. But he resisted Satan again, he fought, and it is God's right to get him into Paradise."[13]

One of the last verses (123) of the same *sura* contains a direct instruction to fight against the heathens, advising Muslims to proceed step by step ("Oh, you, who believe, fight the heathens that are closest to you").

Q 22:78: 'And strive for God with the truest endeavour (*jahidu fi llahi haqqa jihadihi*)'.[14] al-Qurtubi[15] explains "endeavour" as follows: "Some have said: the verse refers to the fight against the heathens. Others have said: this is an instruction that we must keep everything that God has ordered, and refrain from everything that God has forbidden. It means: fight yourselves (your souls) for obedience to God, and keep yourselves from (sinful) passion. Fight against Satan to reject his temptation, and against the sinful to reject their sin, and against the heathens to reject their faithlessness." Ibn Kathir's[16] explanation notes: "The truest endeavour means: with all your wealth, speeches and yourselves (your souls)."

Q. 25:52: 'Do not obey the unbelievers, and strive mightily with it against them'[17] al-Qurtubi speculates that the expression "with it" means (according to many) with the Qur'an, while according to others it means with Islam. There are also others, he says, who believe it means 'with sword', but this is a projection of meaning, since the above is a Meccan *sura*, from the time when God had not yet ordered the prophet to fight (*qital*) against the heathens. This knowledge is part of the sub-discipline *asbab al-nuzul* (the reasons or occasions of the revelation).[18] For the past century, however, this

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[12] *wa-jihadin fi sabilihi*. The word *jihad* is often accompanied by the word *sabil* in the Qur'an, *fi sabilihi* can be interpreted as "on the path of [God]", or "for God".

[13] AL-QURTUBI, *Tafsir al-Qurtubi: al-Jami' li-ahkam al-Qur'an.*

[14] *Jihad* has no independent meaning here, it only serves as an adverbial complement to the verb.

[15] AL-QURTUBI, *op. cit., l.c.*

[16] IBN KATHIR, *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-Azim.*

[17] In the original: "*jahidhum bihi jihadan kabiran".*

[18] This discipline that emerged in the Middle Ages is the reason why the history of the Islamic age and research into the Prophet's life have become so important for Muslim scholars. It examines when, under what circumstances, in which phase of the Prophet's life, a given verse of the Qur'an was revealed, and it is based on this that scholars attempt to establish

insight has been readily rejected, when disregarding the interpretation was more suitable for the desired ends.[19] Disregarding the "reason of the revelation" implies that the more appropriate interpretation is that *jihad* should mean armed fight.

Q 60:1: "If you go forth *to strive in My way* and to seek My approval [and yet] secretly show them friendship (i.e. to the heathens)."[20] This verse from the Qur'an illustrates the problems that the interpretation and the translation of the word *jihad* usually imply. In this text *jihad* is only an adverbial determinant of circumstances, and the verse in fact tells about the dangers of having, among the ranks of the Muslims preparing to conquer Mecca, some who still think affectionately of their fellow heathen clan-members and family members, although they are now enemies of Muslims and of God. A group of commentators and translators interpret *jihad* in its general meaning as *effort*,[21] while the other group interprets and translates it as *fight*, referring to the fact that, according to the examination of 'the reasons of revelation', the Muslims were really preparing to march on Mecca.[22] It is understandable that the latter view has become prevalent in our days. It is ironic, however that those who emphasize that here the cause of the revelation was the preparation for the siege of Mecca, are not willing to take circumstances into consideration in other cases.

Occurrences of the verb jahada *(to make an effort) in the Qur'an*

The verb *jahada*, the infinitive of which is *jihad*, occurs in 27 verses of the Qur'an, in different forms. The verbal form, just like the infinitive, often precedes the expression *fi sabil Allah* (for God, on the path of God), which confirms that the word is used in the general sense of "making an effort", rather than meaning specifically war.[23] This interpretation is lent further support by another context even more frequent than the previous one: *bi-amwalikum wa-anfusikum,* which means "with your wealth and

its meaning and precise legal relevance. Among others, the emergence of the discipline implied arranging the verses of the Qur'an chronologically, which supported the information that had aleady been familiar from the traditions concerning the life of the Prophet.

[19] There are schools and sects within Islam that have always rejected the examination of "the reasons of the revelation", saying that the Qur'an is God's word that has been valid from and to eternity, and its validity is universal, not specific. To them belong the Hanbalis and the Shiis.

[20] In the original: "*in kuntum kharajtum jihadan fi sabili wa-btigha'an mardati*".

[21] See AL-TABARI, *Jami' al-bayan fi tafsir al-Qur'an.* IBN KATHIR, *op. cit*. and AL-QURTUBI, *op. cit*.

[22] The two works describing the Prophet's life in the greatest detail are: WATT, *Muhammad at Mecca,* and WATT, *Muhammad at Medina.*

[23] On the three forms of the fight for God the *hadith* says that it is fought with hands, but if they are not capable of doing so, with one's wealth, if they cannot do that, with the tongue, and if that is not possible either, then with the heart. See. IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *Zad al-ma'ad,* vol. 2, p. 62.

yourselves (your souls)", as the word *nafs* may mean both self and soul in Arabic.[24] The verb is also often used together with the word "emigrate", "expatriate" (*hajara*).[25]

The historical development of jihad *and its effect on later ages*

How should the *jihad* against the heathens unfold? Scholars of Islamic law[26] say that to be able to answer this question, we should distinguish between two situations. The first situation is when faithful believers have no material power in the world, ignorance and darkness are complete, as material power is in the hands of the heathens, the enemies of God and the Muslims.[27] In this case, the *jihad* against the heathens takes place in the form of propagating among them the religion of God. Everybody believing in God, his prophet, and judgement day has to take part in the *jihad* against the heathens, calling on them to confess the religion of truth, clarifying for them the depravity of their teachings and ways, and the dangers these ways harbour: the spreading of injustice and decay in the earthly world, as well as God's punishment and the torments of hell in the afterlife. The first step, however, must be the self-organization of the believers, their self-examination and the formation of a vanguard, well-read in the matters of Islam.[28]

The second situation arises when God helps the true believers to take material power from the heathens and establish their own state on earth.[29] In this case a *jihad* will be compulsory for the Muslims which, besides the propagation of faith, will also have to include armed fight. This will happen if the heathens do not give up impeding the spreading of faith, and do not follow, out of their own free will, the guidance of the true faith. The heathens have two alternatives to avoid armed fight: they either accept the protection of Islam (*dhimma*), in which case they can keep their religion, or they convert to Islam.[30] If they do not choose either option, it is the Muslims' duty to fight them with men and arms, until their obstinacy breaks.

It may occur, however, that the Muslim state has not enough power to engage in armed fight against the heathens, should they refuse conversion. In this case the duty

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[24] This dualism sometimes also leads to inextricable difficulties in the translations, though in the Arabic language the two things are identical (*i.e.* we do not have to do with two separate meanings).

[25] This has the consequence that *hadith* collections as well as works of law discuss *hijra* in the book of *jihad*.

[26] See YASIN, *al-Jihad: mayadinuhu wa-asalibuhu*, p. 56.

[27] While this situation basically referred to the circumstances of the Prophet in Mecca, it was also well utilized in the *fatwa*s concerning the duties of Muslims that had come under Christian rule in Spain during the Reconquista.

[28] All this demonstrates that moderate Islam does not propagate the fight of individuals or small groups against 'the unbelievers'.

[29] Just as it happened in Mecca in the time of the Prophet.

[30] This is what the words of the Qur'an (2:256) refer to, saying: "there is no compulsion in religion" (*i.e*. in Islam).

of the community of Muslims is at least to repel the heathen attack and prevent them from seizing power over the Muslims.[31]

And, provided Muslim strength has grown with God's help, the duty of the Muslim community (*ummat al-islam*) is to fight (*qital*) against all heathens.[32] From this it follows, however, that *jihad* and actual armed fight (*qital*) are not identical concepts.

Across the ages, for those carrying out the *jihad* against the heathens, Islamic scholars have proposed an example, the Prophet's life. His fight against the heathens was, according to the teaching of Islam, directed by divine inspiration. The Prophet's plan, which had been suggested by God and carried out in several stages, according to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, the 14th century religious scholar held in high esteem ever since, was as follows.[33]

Education, religious, spiritual and moral preparation, and *jihad* ("effort") through calling upon the heathens and providing explanation for them, these activities emulate the Prophet's stay in Mecca from the time that God had assigned him to be Prophet. According to the teaching of Islam, the core of the Prophet's mission is *jihad*. The Qur'an unambiguously states in the Meccan *sura*s what the essence of this fight is: warning and calling (see in verses of Meccan *sura*s such as 74:1-2, 26:214).[34] This is supported by unambiguous historical evidence, i.e. by the essential moments of Muhammad's comportment in Mecca.[35] As we have seen above, verse 52 of the Qur'an's Meccan *sura* titled *Furqan* (25) speaks to the first Muslims. The section warns: "Do not obey the unbelievers, and strive mightily with it (with the words of the Qur'an) against them."

The migration to Medina by the Prophet and a handful of his followers (*hijra*) opened the route in the history of Islam for armed fight against the polytheists of Mecca, and this is reflected both in the Medinan *sura*s of the Qur'an, and the later explanations by Islamic law dealing with *jihad*. 20th century Muslim scholars are justified in disapproving[36] the translation of *hijra* by words meaning "escape" or "flight",[37] because the point of the migration was the commencement of violent *jihad*, the armed fight against the heathens. Muslims may regard this as a divine plan, while non-believers may interpret it as Muhammad's strategy, yet the core will remain the same: *hijra* and *jihad* are closely related concepts.[38] It is also to be noted that if we

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31 Defensive fight also results from *jihad*, not only offensive fight.

32 Ibn QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *op. cit.,* vol. 2, pp. 62-63, YASIN, *al-Jihad,* p. 54.

33 IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *ibid*.

34 "You who are wrapped up in a cloak, arise and warn", and "And warn your tribe, your near relations!".

35 The chronologically arranged verses of the Qur'an, referred to in medieval Muslim science as *asbab al-nuzul,* (the reasons of the revelation), and adopted with some revisions by Western scholars support the information we know from the traditions concerning the Prophet's life. See also footnote 19.

36 *E.g*. YASIN, *op. cit*., pp. 57-58.

37 Though the Prophet's *hijra* was, in fact, *also* a flight, as between the two cities, Mecca and Medina he did not enjoy the protection of either his new clan or the new community, this does not change the fact that the basic meaning of *hijra* is not *escape*.

38 See the aforesaid about their co-occurrence in the Qur'an.

accept the relevant passage of the Prophet's biography as authentic, the people of Mecca dreaded Muhammad's moving to Medina so much that they even thought up a plan for killing him. This, of course, may be an anachronistic later insertion into the text, showing the influence of the later events.

That the basic meaning of the word was not 'escape' is proven by the fact that the second caliph, Omar, called on Arabian Muslims to leave (*hijra*) their homes where they were living in peace and go to the newly established military camps (*amsar*) to take part in the conquests by the Islamic state (*jihad* as "struggle", taking the form of fight or *qital*).[39] "Escape" is clearly not a possibility of interpretation here, interests were a much more probable cause, as the caliph tried to make the ideological struggle more attractive with the promise of sharing in the loot.

Islamic law states the following about armed fight: God has allowed the fight to reverse the harms caused by polytheists (i.e. the enemy must do harm first, and *jihad* may only follow as defence or counter-attack): "Fight for God's cause against those that are fighting against you".[40] But actual war is not a positive (active) duty of every Muslim, not even of every individual community, it is their duty only if they are in the position to fight actively. If they are unable to do so, they must await until at some point in the future they have an opportunity to fight. According to Muslim scholars, this dichotomy mirrors Muhammad's life in the Meccan and the Medinan periods: in Mecca he did not have an opportunity for armed fight, so *jihad* meant an ideological struggle, but after he had moved to Medina, armed fight became a realistic option.

The verse of the Qur'an that allows the holy war speaks expressly about the concept of just war: "God will defend those who believe. God does not love any ungrateful traitor. Permission is granted to those who fight because they have been wronged – for God is able to help them – Those who have been unjustly expelled from their homes merely because they say, 'our Lord is God.' Had it not been for God's warding off of some men by means of others, cloisters, churches, oratories and mosques, in which God's name is much mentioned, would have been destroyed. God helps those who help him. God is strong and mighty; Those who, if We give them position in the land, perform prayer and pay the *zakat* and enjoin what is recognized as right and forbid what is recognized as wrong. To God belongs the outcome of events." (Q. 22:38-41).

The defensive character (in theory) of *jihad* was already emphasized by the great 9th century legal scholar, imam al-Shafi'i, when he said that God had allowed the armed fight to Muhammad and his followers in Medina, as defence. Later it became a duty to fight against those who were fighting, unless they asked for peace (*musalaha*).[41]

Later, the concept of the holy war, just like other religious duties, was deduced from the events of the Prophet's life, this is why religious scholars find it so important to focus on the most accurate analysis and explanation of the early period of Islam, based on the sources they acknowledge.

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[39] On this, see CRONE, "The First Century Concept of Hiğra", 355ff.

[40] IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *op. cit*., vol. 2, pp. 62-63.

[41] AL-SHAFI'I, *al-Umm*, vol. VII, p. 226 ff., Idem, *Ahkam al-Qur'an*, vol. II, p. 11.

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya invoked the three actions (bearing, fighting in defence and fighting) to emphasize the third phase, which, in his opinion, has been permanently in effect since the Prophet's stay in Medina: "Then God made it compulsory for them to fight against those who were fighting against them, with the exception of those who were not fighting, then he made it every Muslim's duty to fight against all heathens, without exception."[42] So the gradual introduction of the *jihad*, according to Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and his modern followers, has followed this model: it was forbidden, then it was allowed, then it was commanded to chastise those who had started fighting, and finally fighting was prescribed against all heathens.

Ibn Taymiyya's teaching

Ibn Taymiyya,[43] a scholar of the 13-14th century with a strong influence on extremist currents that has survived into the present, writes in his work titled *Siyasa shar'iyya*[44] (The policy of divine law). According to him, "The *shari'a* prescribes two kinds of punishment to be applied to those who defy God. One is to be applied against those who are subject to a Muslim ruler, the other against those who can only be subjugated by way of a decisive fight. This latter is the fight against heathens (*jihad al-kuffar*)." The word *jihad* occurs only in one chapter, which makes it clear that the community duty of armed fight (*qital*) against non-Muslims (*fard kifaya*),[45] also for Ibn Taymiyya, is only the first and the most important, but not the only kind of *jihad*. He enumerates every duty to be accomplished in the fight while on the path of God, which become gradually more and more peaceful, finally classifying also the good deeds done in favour of ourselves and other members of the community under the heading of *jihad.* Based on the above, the following kinds of *jihad* exist:[46]

(1) Fighting against the unbelievers,[47]

(2) Fighting against the heretics he calls *kharijis*,[48]

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[42] IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *op. cit*., vol. II, p. 58.

[43] Ibn Taymiyya lived mostly in Syria and died in 1328.

[44] IBN TAYMIYYA, *al-Siyasa al-shar'iyya fi islah al-ra'i wa-l-ra'iyya.* The full title of the work (*The policy of divine law for the good of the ruler and the subjects*) refers to the fact that according to the proper interpretation of Islam, there is no difference between private sphere and public life. In the English translation the work was given the title *Public and Private Law*, which falsifies Ibn Taymiyya's ideas.

[45] Literally, "sufficient duty", *i.e*. it is enough for some members of the community to perform it, as opposed to individual duties.

[46] It is to be noted that in the more recent Western literature it often occurs that the authors mix up the words *qātala* (to fight) and *qatala* (to kill), and they write that according to both Ibn Taymiyya and his later follower Muhammad ibn Adalwahhab, the heathens must be killed, while in Arabic the text only says that they must be fought. See *e.g.* ALLEN, *God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad.*

[47] *Kafir* (plural *kuffar*), literally "refusers" or "ungrateful", those who refuse God's grace.

[48] The first sect of Islam, originating from those who left Ali's camp in 657, when he accepted arbitration, instead of seeking military victory.

(3) Struggling against the hypocrites and apostates neglecting their religious duties,[49]

(4) Showing good intention and tolerance for people,[50]

(5) Appropriate acts for our own sake,[51]

(6) Forbidding inappropriate acts under threat of punishment, to make people avoid wrong,

(7) Finally: *jihad* also means the prevention of sin and taking precautions.[52]

The moderate interpretation of the fight against unbelievers (*kuffar*) in our age

Let us now look at a 20th century summary of Islamic law. In his book published in Cairo in 1990, titled *The Areas and Methods of Jihad*, Muhammad Yasin sets up 5 categories of the *jihad*, in compliance with mainstream Sunni traditions:

(1) Against the soul (*nafs*)

(2) Against Satan (*Shaytan*)

(3) Against unbelievers (*kuffar*)

(4) Against hypocrites (*munafiqun*)

(5) Against the sinful and the immoral (*zalimun, fasiqun*).

The last means the enforcement of the principle of "commanding right and forbidding wrong" (*al-amru bi-l-ma'ruf wa-l-nahy an al-munkar*).[53]

As apparent, the fight against the unbelievers (*kuffar*) represents the third kind of *jihad*: "This means the fight against enemies trying to divert one from God's righteous path. They are the unbelievers (*kuffar*), who had been possessed by Satan and who call God's sign a lie and his Prophet a liar."[54]

The other accusation against non-Muslims is that they do not let Muslims go about their lives and do not let them accomplish what their faith demands from them during their lives. Of course, as it turns out, this point does not refer to the potential

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[49] Those who keep their turning away from Islam in secret and those who give up religion publicly (*murtaddun*).

[50] These people are *salih* (pious), which, funnily enough, shows what positive connotations 'reconciliation' (*sulh)* used to have originally, in the tribal system.

[51] Islam teaches that one must avoid unnecessary risks and consider his/her own interests. See DÉVÉNYI, "A *taqiyya* és a *hiğra* kérdései az andalúziai iszlámban".

[52] Ibn Taymiyya quotes examples such as "If a young person's face is too fair, it must be veiled or removed from people's sight, lest it should lead them into temptation."

[53] This important principle of the Islam is first formulated in the 104th verse of the third *sura* of the Qur'an. This is the principle that entitles people to interfere in others' private lives, and this is the basis on which Muslim extremists are attempting to terrorize the public. For the complete historical overview of the question see COOK, *Commanding right and forbidding wrong in Islamic thought.*

[54] YASIN, *op. cit*., pp. 51-93.

oppression of Muslims living in the Christian world, but its real meaning is that "they prevent God's word from reaching his creatures, they demonstrate hostility towards Islam and raise a barrier in God's path",[55] – *i.e*. they hinder the peaceful propagation of Islam, making fighting them necessary. It must be noted, however, that Yasin (1990), the author of the above line of thought, does not incite to terrorism or other individual actions, in fact, he does not even encourage states to fight the unbelievers. In Islamic law, the word *jihad* does not clearly mean armed fight anyway, as it was shown above. The contemporary author, like the majority of books on Islamic law, discusses *jihad* only in a timeless manner, i.e. referencing the age of the Prophet's life as well as the present.

This is usually supported by the following *loci* of the Qur'an: "They will continue to fight you, until they turn you away from your religion, if they are able" (2:217). "Those of the people of the Scripture who do not believe and those who associate others with God do not like any good to be sent down to you from your Lord" (2:105). "The Jews will not be pleased with you nor will the Christians until you follow their creed" (2:120).

The choice of these *loci* from the Qur'an, as well as the entire treatment of this question in learned works illustrate well the overarching conviction of scholars that it is people following other religions, their hatred and contempt toward Islam, that forces *jihad* on the Muslims. Historically, in the age of the Prophet, this used to be, of course, true, and, as Islamic law does not know the concept of the temporality in history,[56] they consider this claim to automatically hold true for the present as well.

Scholars of Islamic law have considered, and still consider, *jihad* to be the Muslims' duty (*fard*) because, in their opinion, the above-mentioned emotions of non-Muslims arise from the fact that, instead of God's word, they follow their own immoral desires. The seeds of faith must be preserved in people's hearts and God's call (Islam) must be brought to every human being.[57]

Individual actions, terrorism and suicide in the name of jihad

The basis of terrorist ideas and acts has been the classification of non-Muslims as unbelievers (*takfir*), and *jihad* interpreted as holy war. All this, however, is based on a particular interpretation of *jihad*, rather foreign to the spirit of Islam. Neither Ibn Taymiyya nor the later Wahhabi doctrines recommend or prescribe such course of action.[58]

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[55] YASIN, *ibid.*

[56] "God's laws are timeless."

[57] YASIN, *op. cit*., pp. 3-6, IBN QAYYIM AL-JAWZIYYA, *op. cit.,* vol. 2, pp. 62-63.

[58] The spiritual leader of the Ahmadiyya sect in Pakistan, Hazrat Mirza Tahir AHMAT, in his book (*Murder in the Name of Allah*), sharply critiques those who spread terrorism on behalf of Islam, and reminds that the goal of every religion is spreading peace, tolerance and understanding. He goes on to argue that the meaning of Islam, i.e. submitting to God's will, is continually misinterpreted and distorted by minority groups in the community which commit violent and terrorist acts in the name of Islam.

The manuals of Islamic law and the relevant chapters discussing fight always speak about the community or the army representing the community fighting against the unbelievers, as well as about the rules applicable to such conflict, and they never mention individual terrorist acts or indiscriminate massacres.

One of the books of a work titled *al-Nawadir* by Ibn Abi Zaid al-Qayrawani, a 10th century Maliki legal scholar and *mufti*, bears the title *Jihad*.[59] In this section the author discusses all the questions related to fighting and making peace, including rules regarding non-warriors. The law is unambiguous: it is forbidden to kill women, children,[60] nuns, monks. There existed, we are told, disagreements as to whether it was allowed to kill peasants and soldiers not engaged in fighting on the territory of the *dar al-harb* ('the house of war'). During the actual fighting, however, soldiers were granted exemptions from the above prohibitions. Many find these concessions amount to the permission to carry out terrorist acts against women, children and civilians. But this, as I have already pointed out, does in no way fit into the classical legal approach, which only means military action and self-defence by *jihad*.[61]

Verses 207 and 208 of the 2nd *sura* of the Qur'an also contain important instructions concerning the questions of war and peace. "But among the people are those who sell themselves in seeking God's approval. God is gentle towards his servants."[62] In fact, verse 207 encourages merely unselfish fight in favour of God's cause, although for many it represents a call for suicide actions against the unbelievers. This interpretation is also found in several manuals of Islamic law, in which under the heading "praiseworthy suicidal warriors" we find a reference to the above-quoted *locus* of the Qur'an.[63] Those who accept this interpretation translate the *locus* in the following way: "But there are others who would give away their lives in order to find favour with God. God is compassionate to his servants".[64] However, translations avoiding interpretation insist on a literal approach: "(Toutefois), parmi les Hommes, il en est qui vouent leur personne (à la cause d'Allah), recherchant l'agrèment d'Allah. Allah est bienveillant envers Ses Serviteurs".[65]

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[59] This large synthesis was broken down into books by the author.

[60] AL-BAGHAWI, *Sharh al-sunna,* vol. 6, pp. 317-319. When explaining the traditions linked to the person of the Prophet, he devotes a separate chapter (38) within the book on *jihad* to the killing of women and young children and its prohibition.

[61] AL-QAYRAWANI, *al-Nawadir wa-l-ziyadat ala ma fi l-mudawwana min ghayriha min al-ummahat,* vol. 15, *Jihad,* chap. 57-62.

[62] The word *shara-yashri* means both to sell and to buy.

[63] See *e.g*. ABU-SAHLIEH, *Il diritto islamico: fondamenti, font, istituzioni*, p. 592, where the author refers to this verse of the Qur'an under the entry "glorious suicidal warriors" *or I combattenti suicidi lodati.* For details on the question see KHOSROKHAVAR, *Les nouveaux martyrs d'Allah*. In times of war, of course, a lot of things change. One of the Shii religious leaders who had immigrated to Iran, the future Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi AL-MUDARRASI, called for *jihad* and self-sacrifice (suicide attacks) during the Iran-Iraq war in his book: *al-Jihad hisn al-istiqlal*.

[64] DAWOOD's translation.

[65] BLACHÈRE's translation

Al-Raghib al-Isfahani, a medieval commentator of the Qur'an from Baghdad in late 11th century, contributes the following remark to the word *sharin (shurat)*: "The Kharijis refer to this verse when they claim they are *shurat* who sell themselves to God's cause."[66] While the Kharijis were well-known for being fanatic warriors, who called other Muslims unbelievers and declared war against them, they have not been reported to have committed suicidal acts of terrorism.

It is common knowledge that in explaining the verses of the Qur'an the first step is determining the reasons of the revelation (*asbab an-nuzul*). This is done on the basis of the *hadith*s. According to the traditions referring to verse 207 of the second *sura*, this verse was revealed in the wake of the conversion to Islam of a Christian from Mecca, named Suhayb, whom the people of Mecca only allowed to emigrate (*hijra*) and follow the Prophet to Medina if he left all his wealth in Mecca.[67] According to this explanation, this is what the words "sold himself" refer to (while other explanations claim that "bought himself" would have been more appropriate).[68] On the other hand, every interpreter of the Qur'an adds that whatever the original meaning of the verse may have been, public consensus holds that it refers to everybody who are fighting on God's path.[69]

From the age of the Prophet, accounts of the battle of Badr in 624 are often invoked to praise suicidal martyrdom,[70] pointing out that suicide warriors had participated in the battle, to whom the Prophet, in the name of God, promised Paradise. Apart from the numerous traditions, this is also mentioned in Muhammad's biography, the *Sira*. One story has it that one of Muhammad's companions, while eating dates, heard the above promise, and said: So, the only thing between me and Paradise is that these people should kill me? Then he dropped his shirt of mail, took his sword in his hand and went on fighting until he was killed.[71] But this is not considered as suicide, only as brave fighting during an ongoing battle.

Muhammad Ibn Abdalwahhab's Jihadist movement in 18th c. Arabia[72]

Ibn Taymiyya's spiritual heritage is most markedly represented in those Wahhabi doctrines[73] that ensure the legitimacy of the state in Saudi Arabia.[74] These are based

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66 AL-RAGHIB AL-ISFAHANI, *Mu'jam mufradat alfaz al-Qur'an*, p. 267.

67 This, of course, is a so-called special interpretation, which is not accepted by everyone.

68 See IBN KATHIR's and AL-QURTUBI's commentary concerning the given verse of the Qur'an.

69 In the original: "*mujahidun fi sabil Allah".*

70 For a summary of the questions of martyrdom see COOK, *Martyrdom in Islam*.

71 IBN HISHAM, *al-Sira al-nabawiyya,* vol. 3, p. 15, chapter 'The battle of Badr'.

72 A historical summary of the development of *jihad* can be found, e.g., in the following works: BONNER, *Jihad in Islamic History. Doctrines and Practice*; BONNEY, *Jihād: From Qur'ān to bin Laden*. For a competent comparison of the Christian and Muslim concepts of holy war see FLORI, *Guerre sainte, jihad, croisade*. *Violence et religion dans le christianisme et l'islam*; D. COOK, *Understanding Jihad*.

73 The word Wahhabi originally had a pejorative meaning. It was used to refer to the followers of the 18th century sheikh Muhammad Ibn Abdalwahhab (who formulated the doctrines) by their enemies. Adherents call themselves *muwahhidun* (unifiers).

on *jihad* whose meaning, for the first nearly two hundred years of the history of the Wahhabi movement, had been holy war. This is, however, preceded in time by two things: the emigration (*hijra*) from the unbelievers' lands to Wahhabi territory, and declaring all other Muslim groups unbelievers (*takfir*). The accounts suggest quite clearly that, and this is also proven by history, that by this holy war they primarily meant internal fighting among Muslims.

But the doctrine of *jihad* for the Wahhabis does not contradict the thought that if interests so require, one must live in peace. This is illustrated by the peaceful relationship between the Wahhabis and the West in the 20th century. Of course, certain Islamist circles have a rather simplified view of *jihad*. Such are the so-called Jihadist movements in Saudi Arabia that propagate permanent fighting, but these latter contradict official Wahhabi doctrines on the issue.[75]

If we are to understand the contemporary interpretation of *jihad*, we must turn back to Ibn Taymiyya of the 14th century. The starting point of the modern approach since the 18th century has been his interpretation.[76] Ibn Taymiyya returned to the duty of permanent fight compulsory for everyone and considered it the essence of Islam.[77] This continues, he said, until the whole world embraces Islam. At the same time he considered it to be the most meritorious virtue which will be rewarded. The history of his time, the first third of the 14th century, lies behind his thoughts: in the dangers of Mongol attacks and the spread of Shii thinking backed by the Mongols. According to Ibn Taymiyya, those Muslims should be fought who lost their faith and do not care for the community of the Muslims.

His own contemporaries regarded Ibn Taymiyya's teachings to be extremist and heretical and rejected them. The author himself ended up in prison. However, he was not forgotten: his late follower, Muhammad Ibn Abdalwahhab (born 1702-3),[78]

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[74] The head of the Saudi state, the king, is at the same time the Wahhabi imam or religious leader. The history and the spirituality of the Saudi state is excellently summarized by SCHREIBER, *Die Saudis. Macht und Ohnmacht der Herrscher Arabiens*.

[75] See AL-RASHEED, *Contesting the Saudi state*, mainly pp. 156-174 and 176-210.

[76] See IBN TAYMIYYA, *Fatawa,* Vol. IV, pp. 279-318. 'al-Jihad'. For Ibn Taymiyya's views see LAOUST, *Essai sur les doctrines sociales et politiques de Taki-d-dín Ahmad b. Tajmíja, canoniste hanbalite, né à Harrãn en 661/1262, mort à Damas en 728/1328*; ROSENTHAL, *Political Thought in Medieval Islam,* pp. 51-61; and KHAN, *The Political Thought of Ibn Taymiyah.*

[77] At the same time, after the 8th century, the Prophet's tradition spread in the Eastern Islamic world, according to which following the victorious spreading of Islam all over the world, the war must be fought not so much against an external enemy than against the vanity of our inner world and the temptations of Satan. In this respect the following *hadith* is often cited: "After conquering Mecca, Muhammad said in front of the warriors: You have accomplished the little *jihad* the best possible way. Now the great *jihad* follows. What is the great *jihad*?, they asked. It is when God's servant overcomes his own desires, the Prophet said." This belongs to the so-called weak *hadiths*, as it has been passed on to succeeding generations through only one informant. This *hadith* is quoted by AL-BAYHAQI, *Kitab al-zuhd al-kabir*, vol. I, p. 388, *hadith* no. 384.

[78] On the life of Muhammad Ibn Abdalwahhab and the beginnings of the Wahhabi movement see ALGAR *Wahhabism: A Critical Essay*. See also ADONIS & SA'ID, *Muhammad Ibn*

emerged in the region of Najd in Arabia in the 18th century. He went on to study in Medina.[79] Later, he became acquainted with Ibn Taymiyya's doctrines, of which there was one he identified with: militant *jihad* must be made the basic duty of Muslims. Returning to the Najd, Ibn Abdalwahhab's actual goal was to restore Islam to the form it had during the Prophet and the first caliphs. Besides Ibn Abdalwahhab, there was no significant religious scholar in the Najd region at the time, and thus his words gained immediate and unlimited validity. His doctrines, which his followers carried out with aggressive intolerance, were based on a strictly literal interpretation of the Qur'an and the rejection of every compromise. Even his ex-reformist fellow-student from India did not approve of this. His own uncle wrote about him: "He takes everybody who contradicts him to be an heretic, always referring to the Qur'an and the *sunna*, though he never reached the level of serious religious scholars (*mujtahid*) in his studies."[80]

He remained on the move, forced to change domicile over and over again due to his extremist teachings which in some places he had implemented in practice as a judge. He called all this "propagation of divine unity" (*da'wa li-l-tawhid*), this is why his followers call themselves *muwahhidun*, i.e. Unifiers.[81] He found that morals had extremely deteriorated and that he was surrounded by the faithless who worship trees, stones and tombs, thus trespassing against the principle of divine unity. For this reason, in Huraymila he urged people to destroy the tombs of Muhammad's companions. He sentenced a woman to stoning, and took part in the stoning himself, which stirred public outrage.[82] When some were preparing to murder him, he left for Dariyya, where he quickly recruited new followers. Later he and his followers equated this event with the Prophet's emigration (*hijra)*, when he left "the house of war" (*dar al-harb*), i.e. Mecca, and entered "the house of Islam" *(dar al-islam), i.e.* Medina.[83] Ibn Abdalwahhab's goal was the spiritual conquest of Arabia, and military conquest. Overcoming the resisters and "converting" them were felt to be necessary preconditions for that. They must be given time for conversion, he taught, and they can only be sentenced to death afterwards, if they do not show repentance. However,

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Abdalwahhab. On the character and history of the Wahhabi propagation of faith (*da'wa*) see ALGAR, *op. cit*., COMMINS, *op. cit*., and DELONG-BAS, *Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*.

79 On this see VOLL, "Muhammad Hayya Al-Sindi and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth Century Madina".

80 See ALLEN, *op. cit*., p. 51.

81 Wahhabism is not the first current in the history of Islam that has referred to itself by this name. The best-known "precursor" in this respect was a Berber dynasty in the 12-13th centuries whose name became known in Europe through Spanish mediation: the Almohads.

82 The story relates that the woman admitted her adultery to the sheikh herself, who only ordered her repentance and making a vow for the first and the second time, but when she confessed her infidelity the third time, he sentenced her to stoning. The strange behaviour of the woman and the public outcry caused by the sentence suggest that such a strict judgement of adultery and stoning were unknown in contemporary Najd, just as the practice of the judge taking part in executing the sentence, though it is a well-known regulation in Islamic law.

83 According to the doctrine of Islam, the Prophet's life serves as a model for every Muslim. The biographers of outstanding religious scholars and mystics have always paid special attention to pointing out the parallels.

the Saudi tribe transposing the sheikh's teachings into practice did not pay attention to such subtleties, and during the campaigns they preferred robbing and murdering the vanquished immediately.[84]

In 1744 the religious scholar and the tribal chief Muhammad Ibn Saud entered into a close relationship, mutually vowing loyalty to each other before God. Ibn Saud assumed the title of *amir* (earthly commander), while the scholar was given the title *imam*, and later *sheikh al-islam* (the chief religious office-holder in Islam). This act was the basis of the Wahhabi group that 180 years later established the monarchy on a religious-tribal basis over the larger part of Arabia, calling it Saudi Arabia.[85] The Wahhabi doctrine is centred round the aggressive interpretation of *jihad*, which *de facto* legalized and multiplied tribal marauding campaigns and surprise raids. Though the tribal wars and raids (*ghazwa*), and the holy war fought under the auspices of Islam seemingly differed only in size, and, of course, both had an economic component to them,[86] it would be wrong to claim that *jihad* only consisted of acquiring means of sustenance. Contrary to the opinions of several Western historians, Montgomery Watt expounds in detail his opinion that without the ideological basis of *jihad* there could not have been successful Muslim expansion in Arabia during the Prophet's life and far beyond Arabia's borders after his death.[87] The same consideration applies to the Wahhabis' holy war. However, Ibn Abdalwahhab soon realized that Ibn Saud's tribe considers robbery as the main goal of campaigning, and he withdrew from public life disillusioned, not undertaking any public role from the 1770s onwards.

This aggressive Wahhabi attitude had an impact on the whole of 20th century Islam. It is to be noted, however, that throughout its history, *jihad* started on the basis of official Wahhabi calls was always directed against other Muslims regarded to be unbelievers,[88] and never against Christians or Jews.[89]

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[84] At this point we do not find any more similarities between the Prophet's actions and the actions of Ibn Abdalwahhab's followers. Characteristic of the difference between the two patterns of action is the capture of Mecca, when the prophet Muhammad did not allow looting. As a result, a few weeks later, the people of Mecca could be found fighting on his side against other Arab tribes.

[85] For the history of Saudi Arabia see M. COOK, "The Expansion of the First Saudi State: The Case of Washm", and COMMINS, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia.*

[86] As a result, it is customary to consider the raids as part of the economic activities of the Bedouin tribes, a form of the secondary distribution of goods.

[87] For details see WATT, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, pp. 65-67 and 158, and WATT, *Muhammad: Prophet and Statesman*, pp. 108-109.

[88] Classifying Muslims with divergent views as faithless *(takfir*) is still the foundation of the modern Saudi state, a tenet which explains why they have been and spreading the true faith (*da'wa*) relying on the vast financial means available to them.

[89] In the first third of the 20th century extremist Wahhabi circles rioted to achieve that non-Muslims would be banned from setting foot on the territory of Saudi Arabia, but on this count they were not successful. They are only banned from the holy regions of Mecca and Medina. See HABIB, *Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and their Role in the Creation of the Saudi Kingdom,* 1910-1930; AL-RASHEED, *op. cit*., pp. 1-6.

Jihad *in the 20th century*

Neofundamentalists[90] *and radicals*

In our age there are two trends in Sunni (orthodox) Islam that seek to change the existing order of the world, and for this reason are regarded as extremist. The followers of one of them are customarily called neofundamentalists, while the followers of the other are referred to as radicals. The difference between the two lies in the fact that radicals rely on several innovations, among others in their definition of *jihad*. They regard it as a fundamental duty, though it does not feature among the five pillars of Islam, they speak about permanent *jihad* being compulsory for everyone (*fard 'ayn*), and they ignore the major *jihad*, the fight for spiritual purification, and they only consider armed fight as constituting *jihad*.[91]

On the contrary, neofundamentalists follow the traditional approach, and are rightly considered to be conservatives. In their opinion *jihad* is a duty of the community (*fard kifaya*), and it can be declared only by the authentic and acknowledged leader of the whole community (*umma*), under particular conditions, and in no way permanently.

The role of Sayyid Qutb

One of the chief propagators and ideologists of the innovative radical wing was the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb.[92] Like the Wahhabis, he also thought 'faithless' Muslims, i.e. those not following the right path, to be primary targets of *jihad.* Many regard him as the spiritual leader of 20th century *jihadism*.[93]

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[90] Today it is customary, also in foreign languages, to use the Arabic word *salafi* to refer to fundamentalists. But this is a traditional medieval term, and is not suitable to reflect the differences between medieval, primarily Hanbali and neo-Hanbali *salafi*s and their contemporary successors, who are also influenced, besides conservatism, by the situation and the events of our present. This is why using the European term is more fortunate. There are some in the Arab world who use the term *usuli*, too. However, this is confusing more than anything else, as this is used as the verbatim translation of the European expression "fundamentalist", but at the same time this term has long been reserved in Arabic for referring to "a person who keeps religious regulations."

[91] Among KEPEL, *Le prophète et pharaon: les mouvements islamists dans l'Egypte contemporaine,* pp. 30-67. Idem, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam.* Cf. ROY, *Globalised Islam. The search for a new ummah,* p. 42.

[92] For the theory of Sayyid Qutb in detail see KHATAB, *The Power of Sovereignty. The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb,* Part One: Religio-political discourse, pp. 1-65. See also JANSEN, "Sayyid Qutb"; and TRIPP, "Sayyid Qutb: The Political Vision".

[93] *E.g.* ROY, *Globalised Islam,* p. 250, though later (p. 257) the author remarks that some jihadist movements, and not only the Saudis, do no accept Qutb's pessimistic view of the world. See also VERTIGANS, *Militant Islam: A sociology of characteristics, causes and consequences*, pp. 10, 14-15.

Sayyid Qutb, in his short but inspiring work *Ma'alim fi l-tariq* (*Milestones*),[94] expounds that military *jihad* is part of practical, active Islamic life, it constitutes a precondition for the spreading of Islam (*da'wa*), which might lead to truly just Islamic society. "While peace is a basic characteristic of Islam, against those hindering the power of Islam *jihad* is necessary", he writes. He argues that, besides preaching and persuasion, the means of *jihad* must also be called upon to liberate Muslims from man-made slavery and to ensure that they may serve the only true God and the confession of Divine Unity.

Defensive and offensive jihad

As it has been discussed above, two types of *jihad* have developed both in theory and practice: defensive and offensive *jihad*. Supporters of the former can be found among members of radical movements, as well. To them belonged Abdallah Azzam, of Palestinian descent, who was the spiritual father of the anti-Soviet war of the 1980s in Afghanistan.[95] Also Sheikh Qaradawi, a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers movement, who holds a key position in the religious organization of Qatar, and who endorses the Palestinian attempts against Israeli occupation, but condemns the attack on the World Trade Center, where thousands of innocent people have died (among them Muslims).[96]

The advocates of offensive *jihad* include the members of the al-Qaida group, who are intent to launch a general attack against the West. Their priority, as among the Andalusians fled to the territory of today's Morocco after 1492, is recapturing the lost territories: fighting against the Soviet power, later against Western intervention in Afghanistan, supporting Bosnia, the independence of Chechnya, the secession of Kashmir from India, the independence of the Southern Philippines, etc.[97]

True faith first, jihad *second*

According to the views of the neofundamentalists, of which one of the best-known propagators is Sheikh Hilali, God will only give victory to the Muslims if they return to the principles of true faith. That's why *jihad* is unnecessary.[98] So it is understandable that keeping the *shari'a* (God's law) is more important for them than the transformation of the state or capturing political power. All this means that neofundamentalists are opposed to Islamists (jihadists), though their views on many

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[94] First edition Cairo, [1964], later reprinted annually. Cairo – Beirut, Dar al-Shuruq.

[95] While Azzam advocates defensive *jihad*, he also says that in the current age every *jihad* counts as defensive. AZZAM, "Join the Caravan", the English translation was prepared by one of Azzam's followers.

[96] Suicide attempts have nothing to do with Islam, states the *fatwa* issued by sheikh Yusuf al-QARADAWI, together with others, following the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Saudi chief mufti did the same on September 20, 2001, see AL AL-SHAIKH, Abd al-Aziz, *The Mufti of Saudi Arabia on the New York Attacks*.

[97] See the different articles about offensive jihad at http://www.ict.org.il/.

[98] See PAZ, *Qa'dat al-Jihad.*

questions, e.g. concerning the *umma*, are identical. *Umma* (the community of Muslims) is, in their opinion, in a pitiful state, and it is subject to the cultural attacks of the West.[99] So the enemy is the West, although they hold divergent views as to how this attack should be responded to.[100] Neofundamentalists rarely suggest *jihad* as opposed to propaganda, while Islamists consider the Islamic state as their goal, and *jihad* ranks among the means for its establishment. An intricate web of contradictions can be perceived in the opinions concerning the personality and the teachings of Sayyid Qutb. The Wahhabis condemn Sayyid Qutb, probably due to the anarchistic bent of his doctrines.[101] The Wahhabis think, instead, in terms of the Saudi state. His calls for political action are at the same time welcome by Islamists, but his pessimistic mentality, condemnation of the earthly world and his craving for Paradise are closer to the views of the neofundamentalists.[102]

Major tendencies in the 21st century[103]

In the thinking of today's Islamic extremists two concepts rank as the primary means of rescuing the community: *da'wa* (propagation of faith) and *jihad* (in the sense of armed fight).[104] There are also some who hold that Muslim individuals who have already found the true path have to unite, with no regard to country borders.[105] This community should permanently increase, and both *da'wa* and *jihad* can be good means to this end.

Neofundamentalists, or *salafi*s, are in favour of propaganda (*da'wa*), and say no to *jihad*, which, under the circumstances of the present is identical to terrorism. After the al-Qaida movement failed to destroy the power of the United States, and the attack of 2001 was followed by different counter-attacks and retaliations, this convinced even hesitating neofundamentalists that the right means is not *jihad* but *da'wa*. At the same time, American retaliations also had a reverse impact, strengthening the camp of the militant forces. This led to a widening gap between neofundamentalists and jihadists.

Jihadists, after they had "emancipated" themselves from their respective national backgrounds, have gone on to fight stateless in the peripheries, serving the fictitious interests of a territorial core that does not want them, in order to establish a non-territorial community.[106] Today's warriors are fundamentally pessimistic as they do not feel the support of a real community and fall back on individualist ideas. This is why so many of them choose suicide, since in it they can at least feel themselves purified.

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[99] See the writings of Salim al-Hilali, of Palestinian origin, with special regard to AL-HILALI, "The State of Ummah: In the Light of the Prophecies of the Prophet".

[100] See the discussion forum on the website: http://www.salafipublications.com/

[101] E.g. the late Muhammad bin Salih bin Uthaymin. See AL-UTHAYMIN, *Al-'Allaamah Saalih ibn Muhammad ibn al-'Uthaymeen on Sayyid Qutb.*

[102] KHATAB, *op. cit.*, Part Two: 'Philosophical discourse', pp. 66-116.

[103] The diversity of Islamist tendencies is presented by FULLER, *The Future of Political Islam.*

[104] On the latter see in detail VERTIGANS, *loc. cit*.

[105] On reasons for this see GERGES, *The Far Enemy. Why Jihad Went Global*.

[106] Analysing the movements on territories far away from the centre of the Islamic world is JALAL, *Partisans of Allah: Jihad in South Asia.*

Is jihad *compulsory for the individual*?

The main dividing line between neofundamentalists and the radical groups operating under different names lies in their respective definitions of *jihad*. Is *jihad* compulsory as the sixth pillar of Islam, is it an individual duty, is now the time to fight the enemy, and, last but not least, who is the enemy? The radicals, as well as the groups like Osama Bin Laden's, believe that *jihad* is both permanent in character and an individual duty, while the enemy are the "crusaders" and the Jews. At the same time, mainstream neofundamentalist religious scholars hold the view that *jihad* is a communal duty, and even in times of war there are certain rules that must be observed. In harmony with the above, many among them, including Saudi chief mufti Abd al-Aziz ibn Abdallah, have condemned the 9/11 attacks in their *fatwa*s. Sheikh al-Albani declared that *jihad* can be an individual duty only in extremely endangered territories (such as Chechnya or Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation), and even in such situation jihadists need a leader (*amir*) and an organization that determine the goals and the means. His teaching on the matter may be summarized in the following line of thought. All of us look at the Prophet as a model. In the first half of his period of religious activity, he was only spreading faith (performing *da'wa*), and did not engage in *jihad*. He first provided religious education for his companions.[107] Most of the Wahhabi religious scholars are of the opinion, including even the members of the Hizb al-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), that *jihad* is currently not on the agenda, or is to be pursued at most in a defensive manner. But for them the refusal of *jihad* has a merely tactical function. They think the current period is not suitable, but when the time comes, every Muslim will be compelled to take part in *jihad*.[108]

It is important to emphasize that violence does not necessarily have its coherent theology. When one or more religious scholars call for *jihad*, including violent means, they always do it out of political considerations. There is no necessary correlation between religious or theological opinion and the support or refusal of *jihad* or terrorism. Those who reject Sayyid Qutb's religious views may in certain cases, for political reasons or simply out of hatred, endorse terrorist acts or the al-Qaida. This pattern of behaviour is mainly characteristic of Saudi religious scholars, some of whom hold extremist political views, while their religious views do not differ in any way from the generally accepted Wahhabi doctrines.

Neofundamentalists and politics

Mainstream fundamentalists do not wish to deal with politics, they think politics is un-important until they have brought back all Muslims under the flag of true Islam. The reform of the soul (*jihad akbar*) must precede the reform of the state. Politics does not help to purify the soul, and therefore religious propaganda must be given priority over political action. It is typical, however, that both the supporters of this view and the

[107] AL-ALBANI, *Munazara ma'a tanzim al-jihad al-islami*.

[108] See ROY, *Globalised Islam*, p. 248, fn. 33, for more details *Manhaj Hizb al-Tahrir fi taghyir*. See also http://www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/

Western literature interpret this as "*da'wa* enjoying priority over *jihad*", i.e. they no longer consider 'spiritual war' as *jihad*, as opposed to orthodox views. [109]

The state as shirk *(politheism)*

The genuine *salafi* knows that *shirk* (politheism) can only be overcome by true *tawhid* (monotheism), not by a similar *shirk*, like the state. In their opinion the effort to establish the Islamic state would mean adding to the *shari'a* something that it had not contained before. And this would express that the *shari'a* is not complete, which is equivalent with faithlessness and the rejection of *tawhid*. Sheikh Hilali declared in a famous and frequently quoted speech that first of all, the Muslims should return to the Qur'an and the *sunna*, like the pious ancestors (*salaf*) used to do. In this speech there is not a word about *jihad*, politics, parties or the state. The only important point is not to copy the faithless in any way. But jihadists actually follow just the opposite of this teaching, as it will be pointed out below, wanting to eliminate the West through adopting Western practices.[110]

Individualization as an instance of religious innovation (bid'a)

Supporters of this trend emphasize their conviction that there exists no real Islamic community and authentic leader, consequently it is up to the individual to act and to interpret divine law. A sign of this is that everybody is taken to be able to issue religious rulings (*fatwa*s). Individualists also consider *jihad* a personal duty that extends to everybody. The over-accentuation of the individual also provides ground for suicidal "martyrdom" in favour of the *umma*.[111]

Another sign of individualization is the recent keen interest in *hisba*, meaning legal interventions started on the basis of "accountability or supervision on moral grounds". *Hisba* traditionally does not occupy a significant place in the *shari'a*. The meaning of the concept is that I am allowed to interfere in other people's affairs, private lives and morals and start a legal procedure without being personally concerned.[112] All this happens on the basis of the Qur'an's principle of "commanding right and forbidding wrong". This can be considered to be part of the inner *jihad* and derived from the principle that everybody who does not share my views and does not follow my movement should be regarded as faithless (*takfir*).[113] What makes these cases peculiar

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[109] THE QUR'AN AND SUNNAH SOCIETY, "An Introduction to the Salafi Da'wah".

[110] *Ibid.*

[111] See GUNARATNA, *Inside al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, Chapter 1. See also LEWIS, *The Assassins: A Radical Sect in Islam.*

[112] For the original, intended function of *hisba* see IBN TAYMIYYA, *al-Hisba fi l-islam aw wazifat al-hukuma al-islamiyya*. This work exerted a great impact on 20-21st century extremists. On the actual operation of the institution see ABU ZAYD, *al-Hisba fi Misr al-islamiyya ila l-qarn 16.* Cf. HODGSON, *The Venture of Islam,* vol. 1, p. 347. For its special role in Iberian Islam see GLICK "New perspectives on the *hisba* and its Hispanic derivatives".

[113] The principle of "taken to be faithless" was first formulated by the first Muslim sect in the 7th century, the Kharijis. In the modern age it has been an important guiding principle of the Wahhabis, see *e.g*. AL-RASHEED, *loc. cit.*

is the fact that those starting the law suits are secular persons with no religious education. They want to determine for themselves what *shari'a* is, and, skipping religious institutions and not asking for a *fatwa* in advance, they turn directly to the civil court operated by the state.[114] By this act, they unwittingly advance secularization.

Jihadist terrorists do not act in the spirit of Islam

The opinion according to which the terrorists employing the concept of *jihad* to legitimize their actions are acting in the spirit of the doctrines of Islam cannot be accepted. This is a fallacy widely spread in the West and some otherwise peaceful Muslims sympathizing with the jihadists also consider terror attempts to be the expression of true Islam and look at them with admiration. If, however, we compare their teachings with the doctrines of classical Islam, we come across innovations that, from the aspect of Islam, are heretical.[115] The movements calling themselves Islamists cannot be considered true representatives of Islam, neither ideologically nor from a social point of view. Also contrary to common belief, it cannot be said that the majority of terrorist attacks in the world over the past decades were carried out in the name of Islam. The religious guise is a usual characteristic feature when extremist forces seek support.[116]

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia

The situation of Pakistan

There are two countries which provide the key bases for contemporary jihadist movements: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia – including its government – supported these organizations, until 1998, while Pakistan did so until 2001, mostly in the territory of Afghanistan. The often overlooked peculiarity about Pakistan is that it is in fact not a nation state, as it was established on strictly religious grounds. It is understandable that the Pakistani *jihadist* movements consider the whole South East Asia their own territory, given that Pakistan was founded in the recent past (1947) not as a national state, but as the Islamic religious state of the Indian sub-continent. Until 2001, the ruling (military) elite supported the radical Islamist movements, as their

[114] See *e.g*. ROY, *Globalised Islam,* p. 180.

[115] The arbitrary interpretations and the rejection of traditions are primarily based on ignorance and taking the easy way. Neither the leaders of extremist groups, nor reformists commenting on questions of Islam possess even medium level religious qualifications. None have studied in a traditional Muslim school, the *madrasa*. In most cases they have completed their studies in one of the Western universities, and tend to have a degree in engineering. Taking the easy way means in this context that acquiring a serious Islamic religious qualification takes long years, which these political activists have not done. Even Sayyid Qutb, who attended traditional schools in Egypt in the first half of the 20th century, wrote in the foreword to his 30-volume commentary of the Qur'an that God had "given him inspiration" with the words of the Qur'an, which means, to put it bluntly, that he was unwilling to get engrossed in the sea of traditional Qur'an commentaries.

[116] For a short summary on this see ROY, *Globalised Islam*, pp. 43-44.

goals were identical. However, after 9/11, this relationship broke off, since the state elite established friendly ties with the USA.[117]

The institutionalization of declaring individuals apostates (*takfir*) shows that acts of terrorism, contrary to common belief, are still directed primarily against Muslims. In Pakistan, the fight against 'faithless power' had 1,500 dead victims, all local residents.

Saudi Arabia – between tribalism and Wahhabism

Saudi Arabia, which, besides manpower, also channels hefty funds into Islamist terrorist organizations, is a state of contradictions: a tribal society, with the monarchy lending the country even its name, while at the same time, the country is based on strict religious norms, on the principles of Wahhabi Islam, which claims a monopoly in deciding over what constitutes the right path in Islam. This contradiction has long been covered up by oil wealth, but more recently a strong opposition has been formed among religious scholars.[118] The reason why, as in Pakistan, Islam-based nationalism could not emerge is that there exists no real nation within the state, either.

[117] On Pakistani participation in Afghanistan see ABOU ZAHAB & ROY, *Islamic Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection.*

[118] On the opposition behaviour of Saudi religious scholars, see in detail AL-RASHEED, *op. cit*., a summary in the foreword, pp. 1-22. See also FARDY, *Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent*.

Exploitation of Western liberalism

The main characteristic of contemporary jihadist organizations is that they do not form in the Islamic world, but thrive on the exploitation of the relatively more liberal Western attitudes to religion. In the mosques of Western Muslim communities preachers can talk freely. For instance until 2002 preachers in the United Kingdom were allowed to call for *jihad* without any restrictions, as under British law a mosque or any other religious institution is a legal entity, in whose life nobody, not even its own superior religious authority, has the right to interfere.[119] This is why Tariq Ramadan wrote that the sheikhs in the Western mosques can talk more freely than in the Muslim countries.[120]

Hijra *or* jihad*?*[121]

Islam in minority

The basic dilemma of Muslims living in the West as expatriates concerns the choice between integration and self-exclusion.

Neofundamentalists and Western experts often seem to echo each other when they claim that Muslims are unable to live in minority and that the solution can only be *hijra* and/or *jihad*.[122] Terrorist organizations make every effort to impede or prevent the assimilation of immigrant communities. An example for this could be seen in Canada recently, where in the Shii Muslim communities preachers made savage assaults on the majority wishing to live in peace with the locals, and planned attempts against Canadians. In order to consolidate their position, the leaders of the communities were compelled to turn to Ali Sistani, the Shii chief mufti of Iraq, for a ruling based on canon law. In the end, the chief mufti laid down in writing that the first duty of Shii Muslims living in minority is to live in peace with the non-Muslim majority and to observe the laws of the host country.[123]

Expatriation (*hijra*) – but where?

The destination of *hijra* must be pure Muslim territories (which is more than just a state with a Muslim majority), but what counts as such a territory in the world today?

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119 Cf. ROY, *Globalised Islam*, p. 210.

120 RAMADAN, *Les musulmans dans la laicité. Responsibilité et droits des musulmans dans les sociétés accidentales*, p. 101.

121 See LEWIS & SCHNAPPE, ed., *Muslims in Europe. Social Change in Western Europe*; see also FATHALLAH, *al-Aqalliyyat al-muslima fi Urubba wa-mushkilat al-islam al-mughtarib.* Cf. ABOU EL FADL, "Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on Muslim Minorities from the 2nd/8th to the 11th/17th centuries".

122 See ABOU EL FADL, "Striking a Balance: Islamic Legal Discourse on Muslim Minorities", p. 64 ff.

123 AL-SISTANI, "Obey your country's laws…".

The interpretation and re-interpretation of *dar al-harb* and *dar al-islam* is an important point of theoretical-ideological disputes.[124]

Citizen or Muslim?

In reflecting on the situation of Muslims living outside the Middle East and in the Western world, two groups of views have emerged: one is held by the liberals and the conservatives, who are in favour of assimilation, which means observing the requirements of citizenship, while keeping the regulations of Islam. According to the other approach, citizenship does not matter at all, only Islam counts.[125] The French Muslim Khaled Kelkal, who was the first to commit terrorist attacks in France, had said that he was neither French nor Arab, but Muslim.[126] In spite of this, it is an interesting fact that in Europe Muslims living in France show the highest rate of those responding to pollsters' questions that they are firstly citizens, and only secondly Muslims, or find the two identities equally important.[127]

The lands of origin, the Middle East and North Africa, also have taken on a different meaning for them: they no longer constitute a promised land, the homeland of the Muslim community, to which they long to return from emigration, but a world of despair and spiritual deterioration. The community (*umma*) no longer exists in a geographically specific place, but without borders, everywhere, where true Muslims live.[128] The idea of *jihad* has also undergone transformations, due to these ideological changes. While formerly Islam had to be defended from external attacks on lands belonging to the Islamic world (*dar al-islam*), and, according to Osama Bin Laden, in the peripheries, under this approach *jihad* is not linked to a place, it has been globalized, as *umma* is not linked to any territory either.[129]

Resistance in Afghanistan: the cradle of terrorist jihad

As it is common knowledge, the jihadist movement in the late 20th century crystallized during the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, eagerly supported, besides the United States, by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. After 1991, the anti-Soviet forces turned against the West. They considered the collapse of the Soviet Union as the achievement and the victory of their own fight. However, it would be a mistake to think that it was only then that the Afghan warriors became hostile toward the West. They had always

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[124] See RAMADAN, *op. cit*., p. 110 ff., ABOU EL FADL, "Striking a Balance", p. 70.

[125] MOORE, *Al-Mughtaribun: American Law and the Transformation of Muslim Life in the United States*, p. 11. According to the author, this openly Islamist self-assertion is based on the principle that religion must dominate over belonging to a nation.

[126] Dietmar Loch's interview with Khaled Kelkal, LOCH, "Moi, Khaled Kelkal".

[127] All this can be seen on several websites where young Muslims are interviewed. See e.g. http://contributions: debatidentitenationale.fr/je-suis-francais-et-musulman

[128] Cf. LOCH, *op. cit*.

[129] This question is touched upon in an article by AAL 'UTHMAN, "Rulings on Speaking Languages other than Arabic".

declared that both the West and the East were their foes.[130] Only the Americans believed that the Afghans fighting against the Soviets were their allies. Gratitude does not feature among the concepts of political-religious warfare. Khomeini has never shown gratitude to Iraq or France for giving him asylum before 1979 either. After 1991, when American presence in different parts of the Islamic world increased (the consequences of the Gulf War, Saudi Arabia, Somalia), these forces openly turned against America. Neither were the jihadists moved for a moment when they saw that the American intervention was often made in favour of Muslim interests (Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.), all they saw in it was the expansion of the American world power that endangered the unity of the borderless Muslim *umma*.[131] *Jihad*, however, has an ideological, rather than a concrete political or military character. This is amply demonstrated by the targets of terrorist attacks. There has never been a military target among them, except for the single case of the Pentagon. The greatest strength of al-Qaida organizations recruited from among "Afghan" warriors, and recruits trained in Afghanistan later, was very close comradeship, while their weakness has always been their rootlessness, their inability (and maybe unwillingness) to establish contacts with local social forces. An exception in this respect has been Afghanistan and a part of Pakistan, and, after the invasion, some strata of the Sunni population in Iraq.

The first international jihadist organization similar to al-Qaida was *Bayt al-Ansar* ('the house of helpers'),[132] founded in Peshawar at the beginning of the 1980s by Abdallah Azzam, a Palestinian refugee and leader of the Muslim Brothers organization. He grew disillusioned with the fact that the Palestine Liberation Organization relied on nationalism, not Islam, and so the fight it was carrying out could not be regarded to be genuine *jihad*. Jihad can only be a fight launched on a religious basis, in the interest of the whole Muslim community. It was him who organized sending jihadist warriors to Afghanistan against Soviet invaders. He was not a religious scholar (this is typical of the modern movements), he counted neither among the *salafi*s (neofundamentalists) nor among the Wahhabis. His views were positioned between the classical theory (*jihad* is a collective duty and should not be regarded as the 6th pillar of Islam) and the modern jihadist approach (individual duty, the pillar of Islam).[133] He warned the warriors sent to Afghanistan against interfering with local religious customs, but all in vain. He did not have any long-term plans. He considered Afghanistan not so much to be the frontier of the *umma*, but rather as a military training ground. In his mind the first and foremost virtue of *jihad* was to increase the warriors' faith and religious commitment, independently of the results achieved on the battlefield. "*Jihad* is primarily a religious duty, the most excellent form of worship available to Muslims to achieve the highest levels in honouring God".[134] Azzam intended the Afghan *jihad* to train the vanguard of the *umma*, not to establish an Islamic state there (which finally happened). During the

[130] On this see the confession of the author based on personal experience: ROY, *Globalised Islam*, p. 293, fn. 4.

[131] See AZZAM, *op. cit.*

[132] There exists abundant literature on the role "The House of Helpers", an organization and guest house, played in the genesis of al-Qaida. A detailed report could be read in AL-JUMAHI, "Min bayt al-ansar ila l-jabha l-islamiyya l-alamiyya".

[133] AZZAM, *op. cit*, Part Three: Clarifications about the issue of *jihad* today.

[134] *Ibid.*

Afghan campaign there were no terrorist attacks against civilian targets, and no Soviet interests or outposts outside Afghanistan were attacked either.

In 1989 Azzam died in a mysterious car-bomb explosion the circumstances of which have never been cleared and control over the organization was taken over by Bin Laden.[135] The takeover was also approved by the Saudis and the Pakistanis, who ardently supported the new organization and organizational method until 1998 and 2001 respectively. By contrast, the Americans failed to take notice of it until as late as 1998. Tens of thousands of Saudis, Egyptians and Algerians travelled to Afghanistan through different Islamic organizations, for training and *jihad*, not mentioning the Pakistanis, who were usually not under the authority of Bin Laden. While organizing, they failed to overcome the Sunni-Shia conflict (there have never been any Iranians or Iraqi Arabs in their ranks, neither have there been any true Palestinians [i.e. not refugees] or Afghans). Some of the warriors were killed in action, the majority went home and usually helped form the radical groups that seceded from mainstream Islamic organizations. A part of them, however, stayed in Afghanistan, and served as the basis of the al-Qaida organization. The "Afghans" (the local component in the movement) also played an active role in the founding and the activity of extremist Algerian organizations FIS and GIA. Another part of the veterans stayed in Afghanistan, led by Bin Laden, and travelling about in the world, they maintained and revived their old Afghan connections. The cells, the organizational units formed between 1989 and 1996 differed from the former Afghan jihadists in that they were much more Westernized both technologically and in their culture, they did not have relations with any Muslim country or Muslim organization, and they formed "flying brigades". The "mobile *jihad*" unit[136] came into being.

The transformation of al-Qaida in the wake of the Afghan war

The members of this terrorist network are Western or at least Westernized, individualized and (heretically) innovative Muslims. Aside from those from Saudi Arabia and Yemen, none of the members has been trained at a traditional Muslim school (*madrasa*) or centre, at most they were closely linked to one or another radical mosque. They have been born and raised in the West, and, after a peaceful middle-class life, they returned to Islam. This Islam, however, was not like any of the versions acknowledged in the Islamic world. Its adherents are characterized by uprootedness, and are unable to adapt either to the country of residence, of their studies or to any of the Eastern Islam countries, including their homeland, where they could not cope with reintegrating into the society. They lost touch with the traditionally important family, and formed an individualist image of Islam that they share only with their 'fellow-warriors'. In the West today they are considered to be the carriers and embodiments

[135] ENGELBERG, in his piece titled "One man and a global web of violence" aims to shed light on the circumstances of the death and the succession, based on the evidence of witness reports.

[136] On the movement of terrorists in the 1990s see OTTAWAY & COLL, "Retracing the Steps of a Terror Suspect". On one of the not-too-clever measures of the Americans in Afghanistan see STEPHENS & OTTAWAY, "The ABC's of *jihad* in Afghanistan Courtesy, USA".

of a characteristic and traditional Islamic image, but this is a fatal mistake. Not only do they not represent the traditional culture, but they are not part of any culture any more, they are rootless and deculturalized. Traditional Islam, like any other traditional religious culture, is built up on a dual basis: on the teachings of the men of religion, and on the tradition-based education provided by the family. Among the members of these extremist groups, both are missing.

They are characterized by internationalism, by the lack of any emotional ties to a homeland or a country. None of them has ever fought in his or his family's original (Muslim) homeland. From this point of view the Egyptian situation can be seen as typical. While the number of people from Egypt joining international Islamist terrorist or jihadist groups is ever growing, the number of terrorist acts in their own country has shown a drastic reduction over the past decade. It is also crystal clear that the Egyptian Islamist and neofundamentalist groups have no relations to the international groups.[137]

The jihad *in the peripheries*[138]

International *jihad* has a peripheral character. This statement can be interpreted in a dual way. On the one hand, in spite of the intensive international reaction to a few very successful actions over the last ten years (New York, London, Madrid), international *jihadist* terrorism in the manner of al-Qaida is peripheral not only in international politics but concerning the linkages between the East and the West, as well. On the other hand, it is also peripheral in the sense that, besides one or two bombings in the West, these cells choose the frontiers of the Islamic world as their zone of operations. Though they are for the most part Arabs by origin, they do not carry out actions in the Arab countries. This is partly due to the fact that in most Arab countries the security services are very efficient, partly, however, they do not have the human background that has been available to them elsewhere (in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Bosnia, Chechnya, etc.). At the same time, they do the organizational work from internet bases located in Malaysia and countries of the Western world. While the Iraqi and the Israeli-Palestinian *jihad* have some religious characteristics, these nevertheless possess a primarily national character, complemented in Iraq by a peculiar sectarian quality due to the Shia-Sunni conflict.

Afterword

The clear definition of the concepts of *jihad* and *kafir* has great significance for studying and appropriately assessing 21st century Islam. In the Arab texts the situation

[137] At the same time, some Western jihadist terrorist organizations try to 'export' their activity to Arab countries, though with limited success, as they do not find ties to local organizations. A good example for this is the three activists of Hizb al-Tahrir, who were arrested and brought to court in Egypt in 2002. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, "Egypt: Opening of Trial of Three Britons and 23 Egyptians".

[138] From the articles focusing on this question see ROY, "Al-Qaida Brand Name for franchise (General Analysis on Empire)".

is simpler, there is no need to work with precise notions, difficulties arise when it comes to translating these texts. Mistranslations or one-sided translations may mislead not only the lay reader but also the experienced researcher.

Jihad is identical with faith, goes the teaching of the *shari'a*, in the sense of the *da'wa*, the propagation of faith. This, quite mistakenly, creates the appearance for some that *jihad* is therefore identical with the political dimension of Islam as such. *Jihad*, however, includes the whole of Islamic faith rather in the sense that it includes every act of the Muslim community, as a Muslim has to serve God at all times.

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